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Introduction 
In the 1990s, Japan experienced a series of devastating internal political, 
economic and social problems that changed the landscape irrevocably. A sense of national 
panic and crisis was ignited in 1995 when Japan experienced the Great Hanshin 
earthquake and the Aum Shinrikyō attack, the notorious sarin gas attack in the Tokyo 
subway. These disasters came on the heels of economic collapse, and the nation seemed 
to be falling into a downward spiral. The Japanese lamented the decline of traditional 
values, social hegemony, political awareness and engagement. In the midst of this crisis, 
nationalism rose to the fore as a solution to the myriad social ills. As we enter the second 
decade of this new century, many seem ready to put this, at times embarrassing, 
resurgence of nationalism behind them. However, this paper argues that the post-bubble 
resurgence of nationalism has radically changed political, juridical and social norms in 
Japan by normalizing expressions of nationalism previously considered taboo, such as 
historical revisionism, patriotic education, and the revision of Article 9 of the 
Constitution. 
Since the end of Japan‘s defeat in World War II, nationalists in Japan have decried 
the government‘s ―apologetic‖ attitude towards Asia and the United States. These 
nationalists have always been a right-wing segment on the fringe of the large Liberal 
Democratic Party in Japan, however recently they have grown in prominence and have 
taken center stage in LDP politics and ideology. For example, Tokyo‘s Governor Ishihara 
Shintarō, former Prime Minister (PM) Abe Shinzō, and professor Nobukatsu Fujioka, to 
name a few, have openly voiced their complaint that Japan is promoting a masochistic 
and western-derived view of history that has left a feeling of guilt among the Japanese 
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people. Therefore, nationalists promote a revisionist history that argues that the Japanese 
were victims of Western imperialism, and that the war in Asia was a war of liberation 
against the imperialist West. They argue that historical revisionism will allow ―children 
[to] be freed from the ‗mind control‘ of the ‗Tokyo War Tribunal view of history‘ and 
sympathetically partake in the war experience as Japanese citizens.‖1  
In post Cold War Japan, revisionist history has most notably been advanced 
through the New History Textbook (Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho, 2001), a conservative 
history textbook written by the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (Atarashii 
Rekishi Kyōkasho o Tsukuru Kai). Although, this textbook promotes an ultra-
conservative view of Japan, the Ministry of Education (MoE) approved the New History 
Textbook for the 2002 school year, making it one of eight history textbooks that the local 
school boards could choose for use in classrooms. Since the Japanese government‘s 
acceptance of the New History Textbook, there has been a strong trend in all history 
textbooks towards ‗watered down‘ coverage of the controversial events in the Asia-
Pacific War, such as comfort women and Unit 731. While the New History Textbook is 
the most recognized form of historical revisionism, it can also be seen at the Yasukuni 
Shrine in Tokyo where fourteen Class-A war criminals are enshrined, and in Japanese 
museums that commemorate the Asia-Pacific War. The common war narrative presented 
throughout historical revisionism reveres the sacrifice, loyalty, and struggle of the 
Japanese military and citizens during World War II. Moreover, it chooses not to discuss 
the victims of Japanese aggression and the indoctrination of blind loyalty and patriotism 
that allowed the unnecessary sacrifice of so many Japanese lives.   
 Minoru Iwasaki and Steffi Richter argue that historical revision of the war and war 
                                                 
1
 Iwasaki and Richter, 508-509. 
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memory accidently arose to fill the ideological void that occurred in post-bubble Japan. 
They explain that post-war Japan lacked a cohesive ideology because Shintoism and the 
Japanese belief in their own superiority had been invalidated with their surrender in 
World War II and the emperor's subsequent renunciation of divinity. During the early 
post-war era of high growth, the Japanese were able to substitute their economic success 
for a collective war memory. But when the economic bubble burst, the social and political 
changes that accompanied it in the late 1980s and early 1990s began unraveling the fabric 
of society.  The ―so-called readjustment and structural reform policies began to threaten 
the corporate, school, and family systems, which were important pillars of Japan's 
postwar community as well as the material basis of middle-class consciousness in its 
support of welfare-society and livelihood guarantees.‖2 As Iwasaki and Richter argue, the 
lack of a cohesive national ideology caused a resurgence of nationalism in Japan to fill 
the void left open by the economic crisis.  
 The post-war narrative of nationalism described above ascribes the rise of 
nationalism to the unstable environment of post-bubble Japan. But, I argue that the 
nationalist rhetoric that emerged in the 1990s has been purposely crafted by the 
government to imply that historical revisionism, patriotic education, and constitutional 
revision, particularly over Article 9, are necessary remedies for the supposed internal 
social collapse and emerging regional threat.  According to William Kelly and Merry 
White, the 1990s undermined confidence in the idealized ―family-nation‖ relationship 
that makes up the ideology behind the family emperor-state, the corporation as a family, 
and the family as social bedrock of the state.
3
 But, David Leheny argues that these 
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conceptions of the Japanese state were powerful popular myths reinforced by the public 
rather than actual truths: 
―The concept of ‗family‘ used in this conception of the family-nation is a 
relatively recent and somewhat fragile construction, and Japan has been 
characterized by far less social mobility than a ‗meritocracy‘ thesis might suggest. 
Japan‘s employment relations have moreover been the long-ideal for only a subset 
of Japan‘s workers, primarily those in large manufacturing firms rather than those 
working for the subcontractors on whom those firms rely. And Japan‘s 
homogeneity has been a carefully constructed myth that has masked the reality of 
a country with significant minority and foreign populations.‖4 
 
Therefore, the social collapse that the conservatives point to as the justification for 
nationalist policies may not be that dramatic, yet it has been described as a national 
phenomenon and crisis.  
 Despite the validity of the conservative claims, the notion that the new social 
trends in Japan are a verifiable crisis has effectively permeated government agencies, 
such as the Ministry of Education. As stated in the Basic Plan for the Promotion of 
Education, the Ministry of Education seeks to promote patriotic and moral education as a 
way to correct the diminishing values of the nation‘s youth and by extension restore order 
to society. Since the end of the 20
th
 century, the Ministry of Education and the Japanese 
government have implemented reforms that are intended to forcefully inspire patriotism 
and loyalty to the state in students throughout Japan. In 1999, the Japanese government 
enacted a law that designated the Hinomaru and Kimigayo (the flag and anthem used in 
prewar and wartime Japan) as national symbols, even though they still represent 
imperialism and subjugation for many Asian nations. Moreover, in 2002, the Ministry of 
Education distributed ―Notebooks for Moral Education‖ (Kokoro no nōto) to include 
moral education in the schools‘ curriculum. ―Notebooks for Moral Education‖ is seen as 
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problematic because it implies that it is healthy and natural to feel the same love toward 
your family as you feel toward the entire country. This is reminiscent of the pre-war and 
wartime textbooks called Shūshin (National Moral Education) that instructed students in 
moral education and served as a tool to mobilize the students during wartime. Finally, in 
2006 the Fundamental Law of Education, which was empowered by the Constitution and 
sets the standards of Japanese education, was revised to change the focus of education 
from educating citizens to educating national subjects. All references to the Constitution 
and individuality were removed, and the Ministry of Education was given significantly 
more direct control over curriculum and schools.    
 Similarly, the perceived imminent threat of North Korea has prompted drastic 
reforms in Japan's defense and counter-terrorist policies without a proper discussion of its 
actual threat. Since 9/11, the government has used the kidnappings of Japanese citizens 
by North Korea in the 1980s, North Korean test missile launches over Japan, and the 
appearance of suspicious boats (fushinsen) in Japanese waters to perpetuate widespread 
fear of a North Korean terrorist attack. In response to the domestic concerns over North 
Korea and the global culture of fear created after 9/11, the Japanese government has 
expanded the capabilities of the Self Defense Force outside the scope of Article 9. For 
example, three bills were passed in 2003 that allow the Cabinet to bring immediate 
military courses of action to the Diet for approval, which empowers the prime minister to 
exert executive power.
 5
 In addition, in 2004 the Japanese Diet approved spending $1 
billion to begin work on a missile defense shield that will be part of the United States 
missile defense system, linking the continental US and its allies.
6
 These laws enable the 
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SDF to launch preemptive strikes if the threat is deemed imminent (with less chance of 
retaliation), which is a complete departure from Article 9 of the Constitution 
 The controversial education and security policies advocated by the conservative 
right were initially met with wide, vocal criticism from domestic liberals, special interest 
groups, and Asian nations. But over time domestic organized resistance has fallen away 
due to the lack of money, resources, and resolve. After the initial waves of protest against 
the law on the Hinomaru and Kimigayo and inclusion of the Self Defense Forces in the 
Iraq War failed, the momentum behind each resistance died away. Individual teachers 
were the only people left fighting the conservative educational reforms, and they were 
unable to garner success in the courts or among the general populous. On March 17
th
 the 
Tokyo High Court rejected a lawsuit filed by 132 public school teachers in Kanagawa 
Prefecture who were contesting the constitutionality of the government instated 
obligation to sing the Kimigayo.
7
 The last case that was accepted by the High Court was 
in 2007 when they ruled that forcing music teachers to accompany the Kimigayo was not 
a violation of the Constitution. Similarly, the protests against the Iraq War initially 
created a mass movement primarily made up of freeters, a new social group in Japan 
characterized by their part-time employment and non-conformist ideals. But, by the end 
of 2004, almost all organized resistance had ended, due to the government‘s 
criminalization of the leftist activists and lack of political and intellectual support. 
Although, there are some nascent movements in Japan resisting the implementation of 
conservative policies, by and large their efforts have been unorganized and ineffective. 
This suggests that the political spectrum in Japan has been moved to the right and that the 
nationalist discourse is becoming a norm in society.  
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 From the late 1990s though the turn of the century, scholarly and popular domestic 
media voiced concern that the revision of war history, rise of patriotic education, and 
expansion of the Self Defense Forces were signs of the rebirth of Japanese militarism. 
However, as we approach the end of the first decade in the 21
st
 century, the apprehension 
and resistance to new nationalism in Japan seems to have evaporated, despite the 
previous implementation and continuation of conservative policies that clearly support a 
nationalist agenda. Many people point to the election of Democratic Party Leader Prime 
Minister (PM) Hatoyama Yukio and the fall of radical LDP PM Abe Shinzō as clear 
indicators of the decline of the conservative right and the end to the neo-nationalist 
discourse in Japan. While the current party in power may not espouse the nationalist 
ideals of the previous prime ministers, the legacy of the LDP‘s radical policy changes and 
the support for right-wing civil society groups has remained strong in Japan. The 
conservative policies that were implemented under the LDP in the past decade have not 
yet been overturned and there is no reason to believe that they will be in the future. The 
concept of ―returning to normalcy,‖ usually associated with the expansion of Article 9, is 
in fact being expanded to encompass all nationalist policies.
8
 Yet, now these policies have 
been implemented under the guise of fears of domestic social collapse and external 
threats, and therefore lack a fruitful discussion of their political and social consequences 
in Japan. 
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Section I: Historical Revisionism 
 
 The debate on historical revisionism in Japan has been at the forefront of domestic 
politics since the 1960s. Japan's defeat in World War II and the resulting occupation 
forcibly transformed it into a peaceful state where the education and government policies 
mirrored the ideals of a new Japan. However the controversial Tokyo Trials and the 
sudden emergence of the Cold War and economic boom that engulfed Japan moved the 
nation forward without a harmonized narrative of war memory. The abrupt transition in 
U.S-Japan relations from enemies to allies prompted the necessity for the formation of 
what historian Yoshikuni Igarashi describes in his book Bodies of Memory as the 
―foundational narrative‖ of U.S. Japanese postwar relations.9 The foundational narrative 
attributes the end of the war to the heroic decision by President Truman to use the atomic 
bomb in Japan, which supposedly saved millions of lives, and to Hirohito‘s equally 
heroic ―divine decision,‖ to surrender and save Japan from total destruction. This 
narrative justifies to the United States and Japan the use of the atomic bomb and the 
ensuing transformation of their post-war relationship.  
The foundational narrative presented Japan as a victim, and neglects to 
acknowledge Japanese aggression against other Asian nations or assign guilt to anyone 
other than the highest echelons of the wartime Japanese military. In the years directly 
following the war, the American occupation authorities feared that discussing the 
Japanese war atrocities might incite a counter-campaign against the Allies for their ―own 
atrocious policies,‖ the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.10 Therefore, 
Japan‘s own actions abroad were never discussed and the dichotomy of the actors in 
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World War II became seen as purely American and Japanese. This narrative that focuses 
on America‘s role, particularly the remembering of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has ―easily 
become a way of forgetting Nanjing, Bataan, the Burma-Siam railway, Manila, and 
countless Japanese atrocities these and other place names signified to non Japanese.‖11 
The victim consciousness attributed to the atomic bombing continues to complicate 
Japan‘s war memory today. 
The foundation narrative continued to define US-Japan relations until the late 
1980s, when the Cold War political paradigm began to dissolve. ―The breakdown of the 
Cold War political structure and its comforting story of good versus evil…has 
complicated the loss of the East West binary that undermined Japan‘s identity as the 
democratic front against Communism in Asia without providing new structures to 
supplant that.‖12 With the national narrative on the Asia-Pacific War open to redefinition, 
the struggle between the right and left over the determination of war memory has 
persisted into the 21
st
 century.  
For the purpose of this section I have chosen to focus on textbook revision, the 
Yasukuni Shrine, and the major war museums that commemorate the Pacific War: 
Yūshūkan War Museum, Chiran Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots, and Showa Hall 
(Shōwakan), all of which present a right-wing revisionist historiography of Japan's past 
which is controversial both within Japan and among other Asian nations. Revisionist 
nationalism focuses on the 'benefits' that Japan's colonization brought to Asia; challenges 
the thesis that Japan is guilty of aggression; and denies the importance, significance, and 
even the validity of historical episodes like the Nanjing Massacre and other war crimes. 
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As we see in the case of textbook revision, Yasukuni Shrine, and the war museums, the 
discussion of suffering is carefully drawn around Japan‘s national borders, silencing the 
majority of the people (Asians and Allies) affected by the Asia-Pacific War.  
Textbook Revision  
 
In 2001, the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (Atarashii Rekishi 
Kyōkasho o Tsukuru Kai) reignited the textbook controversy that began in the late 1940s, 
by introducing the New History Textbook. The society promotes an ultra-conservative 
view of Japan and is trying to popularize their pre-war, right wing philosophy, by 
removing ―dark history‖ from Japanese textbooks in favor of a more positive view of 
Japan‘s past.13 The Ministry of Education (MoE) approved the New History Textbook for 
the 2002 school year, making it one of eight history textbooks that the local school boards 
could choose for use in classrooms. This action, along with the LDP‘s recent conservative 
stance towards Asia-Pacific War memory, has caused a general trend towards ―white 
washing‖ history in average Japanese textbooks. Although, the content of the revised 
New History Textbook is not as radical as it has been construed to be by the media, it 
symbolizes to Japan‘s citizens and the international community the Japanese 
government‘s desire to shift to a more conservative policy when dealing with Japan‘s war 
memory. 
Controversy over history textbooks has been seen in Japan since the beginning of 
the post-war era. In 1946, the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers (SCAP) imposed 
the first screening of history textbooks.
14
 The Americans forced the Japanese to blot out 
passages of their old textbooks to insure that they did not promote militarism or emperor 
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worship. Since then, the Ministry of Education screens all textbooks before making a list 
of seven or eight textbooks that the public and private schools may pick from. Professor 
Ienaga Saburō has played a pivotal role in Japan's debate over the representation of their 
history in textbooks. His high school history textbook that had been in circulation since 
1952 was one of the three most used in early post-war Japan. When it came up for 
revision in 1962, the MoE demanded that Ienaga delete passages to tone down the 
description of Japan's wartime atrocities.
15
 In response, Professor Ienaga filed a lawsuit 
against the MoE's textbook certification system, alleging that his constitutional freedom 
of expression and academic freedom was violated. His lawsuit lasted thirty years, and 
even though Ienaga eventually lost in 1993, the court requested, in 1982, that the 
government refrain from intervening in educational content.
16 
 
 In the early 1980s the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) embarked on a campaign 
to revise over 100 Japanese textbooks with a ―thrust toward greater respect, in effect, for 
State Shinto, big business, duties instead of rights, and the militarism instead of 
pacifism.‖17 In response, the MoE suggested that the history textbooks soften the horrors 
of the Asia-Pacific War and the pacifist requirements of the Constitution. However, the 
1980s was also characterized by the economic and military rise of China and Korea. Prior 
to the 1980s, both China and Korea were developing nations, recovering from the Asia-
Pacific war and internal struggles that emerged afterward. They did not have the 
resources or political clout to demand an apology or reparations from Japan. Sebastian 
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 Ienaga Saburō filed another lawsuit in 1984 against the government of Japan for compensation for 
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Laura Hein and Mark Selden (Armonk, NY: East Gate Book, 2000): 96-126.  
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Conrad argues that the views of neighboring Asian nations barely contributed to the 
views taken on the wartime past because ―the hegemonic role of the USA, undiminished 
after the end of the occupation as a result of the Cold War, also reinforced an ignorance of 
Chinese and Korean perspectives.‖18 The lack of appropriate regional discourse on World 
War II until the 1980s allowed a skewed war memory to develop in Japan until the 1980s, 
when other Asian nations finally made their voices heard in Japan‘s debate over its 
wartime legacy.
19
 
In response to the international outcry in the early 1980s against the historical 
revisionist tendencies in Japanese history textbooks, the most widely circulated textbooks 
of the late ‗80s and early ‗90s discussed controversial issues such as the Nanjing 
Massacre, comfort women, forced suicide in Okinawa, and Unit 731.
20 
The history 
textbooks that were approved by the MoE in 1996 accurately characterize the atrocities of 
Japanese imperialism and rule of their Asian neighbors in World War II. In comparison, a 
1968 history textbook reference to the Nanjing Massacre claimed that ―the Japanese 
killed 42,000 civilians, including women and children.‖21 But in 1985 that same textbook 
was revised to say, ―There were 70,000 to 80,000 deaths of citizens alone, including 
women and children. If soldiers who had thrown down their weapons are included, the 
total number of deaths is said to have reached 200,000.‖22 The height of the ―apologetic‖ 
textbooks occurred in the early 1990s, and since then there has been a conservative 
backlash advocated by Japanese nationalists who insist that ―history stop being treated 
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like a court in which the figures and actions of the past are called to judgment.‖23 
Prior to release, the New History Textbook was revised 137 times (compared to 
the 7 other textbooks which averaged 25 revisions) and many of the most controversial 
statement were removed. For example in the original draft of the textbook, the annexation 
of Korea in 1910 was described as ―conducted in a legal manner based on commonly 
accepted principles of international relations.‖24 However after revision, that passage was 
changed to ―was carried out after suppressing domestic opposition in Korea with the 
threat of military force.‖25 Admittedly, some very contentious statements were kept in the 
final version of the New History Textbook. For example, when discussing the Nanking 
Massacre it states, ―Japanese military officials thought Chiang Kai-shek would surrender 
if they captured Nanking, the Nationalist capital; they occupied the city in December.‖26 
Next to this sentence is an asterisk, which at the bottom of the page says ―Note* At this 
time, many Chinese soldier and civilians were killed or wounded by the Japanese troops 
(Nanking Incident). Documentary evidence has raised doubts about the actual number of 
victims claimed by the incident. The debate continues even today.‖27 In addition, the 
revised textbook covered the previously taboo subject of the Imperial Rescript on 
Education, ―which outlined a Japanese nationalist world view [and] was required reading 
in schools until the end of World War II.‖28  
The members and supporters of the Society for the Creation of Textbook Reform 
are all considered elite intellectuals, politicians, and business men. The Society was 
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founded by Nishio Kanji, a professor of history at the University of Electro-
Communications in Tokyo, in 1996, and has been supported by other elite university 
professors, like Nobukatsu Fujioka, a professor of education at Tokyo University.
29
 The 
Society has strong endorsement from nationalist politicians in the LDP party, such as 
Ishihara Shintarō and former Prime Minister Abe Shinzō.30 A few influential business 
leaders also backed the group, like Imai Takashi, chairman of Nippon Steel and chairman 
of the Keidanren.
31
 This small and elite distribution of interest in ultra-nationalist views 
implies that advocates of the New History Textbook are not representative of the general 
Japanese views. But their money and powerful positions give them the means to widely 
popularize their goal of historical revision. For example, in 2001, the society bought 
thousands of copies of their textbook to distribute as a gift to sympathizers, which helped 
propel the textbook onto the bestseller list.
32
 Due to the high profile and positions of the 
New History Textbook supporters, it can appear that the Japanese people are also in 
support of historical revision, but the actual use of the textbook suggests otherwise.  
Initially, the Society hoped to have the New History Textbook used in 10% of the 
junior high schools in Japan.
33
 However, only 0.03% of all junior high schools, about 
1,300 students, adopted the New History Textbook in 2002.
34 
Although the percentage of 
the junior high schools that adopted the textbook is small, the reception of the New 
History Textbook was not as negative as these numbers suggest. At first the Tochigi 
Prefecture‘s central school board voted to use the New History Textbook.35 But, after the 
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announcement, there was uproar among the citizens of the Tochigi Prefecture and ten 
local school boards declared their intention to reject the textbook, so the central board 
reversed their decision. In many other towns and prefectures, school boards were not 
willing to rule out the New History Textbook, but the visible reaction from the public 
against the conservative textbook forced the decision against it. Four of the schools that 
did accept the textbook were special schools for ―handicapped children.‖ In these cases 
the Tokyo metropolitan school board was allowed to pick the textbooks for these four 
schools; it must be noted that five board members were private citizens appointed by 
Ishihara Shintarō.36  
The real effect of the New History Textbook was not its circulation, but the 
impact that its acceptance had on all of the other history textbooks up for selection. In 
1998, the education minister, Nobukata Michimura, reversed the 1982 law that called for 
respect of Japan‘s neighbors in history textbooks. He explained that ―history textbooks 
were in certain respects lacking in overall balance, tending to overemphasize the negative 
elements,‖ and that he wished to help publishers restore the needed balance.37 This 
comment and the acceptance of the New History Textbook sent a message to editors and 
publishers that they needed to tone down discussions of Japanese wrong-doing and 
aggression.  Therefore in a point-by-point analysis of all of the old history textbooks, two 
Japanese scholars, Hiro Inoguchi and Yoshiko Nozaki, found a strong trend towards 
‗watered down‘ coverage of the controversial events in the Pacific War. ―The word 
‗advancement‘ had replaced ‗invasion,‘ references to Unit 731 had been omitted, and 
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there were fewer references to Japanese colonization of other Asian countries.‖38 These 
changes have caused concern that the strides Japan's history textbooks made in the 1980s 
and 1990s to include an internationally accepted account of the Pacific War have been 
reversed.  
 Although, the actual content of the New History Textbook in its final format was 
not politically correct, it is unlikely to have a direct effect on junior high school students. 
However, when the Japanese government condoned the MoE‘s choice to adopt the New 
History Textbook as one of the eight textbooks junior high schools could pick from, they 
sent out a message to their citizens, the international community, and the ultra-nationalist 
circle that they condone historical revision. It is very likely that the MoE could have 
chosen an eighth textbook that only needed to be revised 25 times instead of the New 
History Textbook that had 137 revisions. Furthermore, the MoE could have chosen a 
textbook that did not contain sensitive chapters on the Pacific War written by 
controversial manga artist, Kobayashi Yoshinori. Kobayashi is also the author of the 
inflammatory manga, On War (Sensōron, 1998), in which he denies that the Nanjing 
Massacre and comfort women were real. But, the MOE's choice was symbolic. It showed 
that the government is willing to support the ultra-conservatives who have ―develop[ed] a 
visible and well funded public presence, demanding a wholesale re-evaluation of what 
they describe as the nation‘s masochistic approach to its own history.‖39  
Yasukuni Shrine  
 The Yasukuni Shrine was established in Kyoto at the end of the Tokugawa period 
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to honor those who died defending the restoration of imperial rule in the Boshin War.
40
 It 
was transferred to Tokyo after the Meiji restoration and in 1879 was designated a Special 
Government Shrine (bekkaku kampeisha). The Shrine has been strongly associated with 
State Shinto and the Imperial Family since its establishment in the Meiji Period. State-
sponsored Shinto was a pre-war and wartime phenomena that emphasized emperor 
worship and was used as a tool to mobilize popular support for the war. Given that the 
Shrine was built as a memorial to those who gave their lives in service for the Emperor in 
past wars, it has remained a ―potent symbol of militarism and veneration of the 
Emperor.‖41  
 From the founding of the Yasukuni Shrine to the end of World War II, 2,500,000 
spirits have been enshrined in Yasukuni.
42
 The enshrinement of an individual elevates 
them to the status of kami, or god. Thereafter the kami are worshipped and receive rituals 
from the Yasukuni priests and the approximately 8 million people that visit Yasukuni 
yearly. The purpose of worship is to ―pacify the spirits of the war dead to prevent them 
from seeking retribution of the living.‖43  
 Following Japan's defeat in 1945, the American occupation forces disestablished 
the Shrine as a government institution. Furthermore, Article 20 of the Japanese 
constitution was added by the occupation authorities to provide for a clear separation of 
state and religious activities. However, since the Shrine separation‘s from the state there 
has been a strong push from military veterans and their families, most notably the Japan 
Association of War Bereaved Families (Nihon Izokukai), for the Shine to retain an active 
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role as a place of memorial and remembrance. Tsukuba Fujimaro was the Chief Priest of 
Yasukuni from 1946-1977. His enduring legacy was the construction of the Chinreisha, a 
simple wooden structure that was dedicated to the war dead of Imperial Japan‘s enemies. 
Tsukuba believed that ―the kami of Yasukuni are active even now as harbingers of peace, 
standing hand in hand with the spirit of the war dead of all the nations of the Earth.‖44 
Tsukuba resisted the Ministry of Health‘s pressure to enshrine the Class-A war criminals. 
However, when he died in 1977, the office of Chief Priest passed to former Imperial 
officer Matsudaira Nagayoshi. Matsudaira enshrined the war criminals, erected a steel 
fence around Chinreisha concealing it from the public and reopened the controversial 
Yūshūkan War Museum museum. The veneration of the Class-A war criminals as kami in 
turn suggests a reverence and concurrence of the war criminals actions in the Pacific War. 
The right-wing leanings of the post-1977 Yasukuni priests, and the Japan Association of 
War Bereaved Families ability to capture political and popular support for the shine has 
resulted in Yasukuni continuing to operate as a conservative 'national' monument in the 
minds of many of the Japanese and foreigners.  
 The tensions over the high-level political visits to Yasukuni are rooted in the 
ambiguity over the Shrine's place in the private or public sphere. The practice of visiting 
Yasukuni was commonplace for both the Imperial family and government officials in the 
early post-war era, but it took on special significance in the 1978 following the 
enshrinement of Class-A war criminals.
45
 The visits to Yasukuni ceased during Prime 
Minister (PM) Nakasone Yasuhiro‘s term in 1985 due to widespread international 
criticism of Japan. Aside from one visit by PM Hashimoto Ryūtarō in 1996, they did not 
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resume until PM Koizumi's first visit in 2001. A significant number of court cases have 
been brought concerning the constitutionality of the Prime Ministers' visits to Yasukuni. 
Some district courts (Fukuoka in 1991) have decided that the visits were unconstitutional 
declaring that the prime minister‘s visit to Yasukuni was a violation of Article 20, the 
separation of church and state. However, other high courts (Tokyo in 2006) have rejected 
the argument that the visits violate Article 20, stating that the prime minister visited 
Yasukuni in a private capacity.
46
 The constitutionality of the visits still has no clear 
consensus. When a case was brought to the Japanese Supreme Court in 2006, the court 
rejected the lawsuit from opponents of Koizumi's visits who claim that the visits violated 
constitutional separation of church and state, and therefore chose not rule on the 
constitutionality of the visits.  
 Prior to Koizumi‘s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, there were opposition groups to 
the shrine, but their resistance took on new meaning in light of his persistent visits. The 
Yasukuni Dismantlement Project (YDP), a leftist group that first surfaced in 1993 with 
thirteen members who oppose the Yasukuni shrine, is the clearest example of active 
resistance in Japan against Yasukuni. The Yasukuni Dismantlement Project has no formal 
leadership or hierarchy, they do not solicit politicians for support, and they only use word 
of mouth to organize their protests.
47
 Like most anti-Yasukuni groups, the YDP seeks to 
promote pacifism and non-violence; however they are unique because they choose to 
protest illegally on the grounds of Yasukuni. The YDP makes sudden appearance son 
August 15
th, the anniversary of Japan‘s surrender in World War II, at the Shrine at the 
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moment of silence to loudly chant anti-Yasukuni slogans.
48
 The last time that the YDP 
was able to get within earshot of the shrine‘s precincts was in 2002. Since then, the police 
have continued to expand the perimeter so that in 2006 the group was not even able to 
reach the Kudan station exit.  
 There are other, more established groups that also oppose and protest against 
Yasukuni Shrine; such as the Pacifist War Bereaved Society (Heiwa Izokukai) and the 
National Christian Council in Japan (NCCJ) (Nihon kirisuto kyōkai). These groups, 
unlike YDP, seem to have accepted their relegation to the outskirts of Yasukuni and their 
lack of voice in the Shrine‘s debate. What all of the anti-Yasukuni groups have in 
common is their lack of strong support or high number of participating members. YDP‘s 
highest turnout for a Yasukuni protest totaled fifty protestors, and a symbolic march from 
Chidorigafuchi National Cemetery to Yasukuni organized from NCCJ and the Pacifist 
War Bereaved Society only brought out 100 protesters.
49
 The groups that oppose 
Yasukuni are pushed to the wayside by the pro-Yasukuni groups like the Japan 
Conference, Society to Repay the Heroic Spirits [of Dead Soldiers] (Eirei non kotaeru), 
and the Japan Association of Bereaved Families (Nihon Izokukai). These citizens groups 
have upwards of 100,000 members, publish literature on the conservative and nationalist 
agenda, effectively fundraise to support their missions, and have the support of many 
prominent politicians.
50
 Furthermore, they are able to mobilize the masses, which became 
evident in the Japan Conference‘s ―200,000 Visitor Campaign‖ to have 200,000 people 
attend Yasukuni on August 15, 2005, the 60
th
 anniversary of the end of the Pacific War.
51
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 In many ways Yasukuni represents just another variation of a remembrance of the 
fallen, working in elements of Japan's religious tradition to explain loss and suffering. 
However, Yasukuni's rituals of enshrinement can also be seen as re-contextualizing social 
memories and attitudes that redeem the war dead that participated in the war and 
indirectly support their ideology and actions.
52
 While there are groups who oppose 
Yasukuni, they are small and ineffective compared to groups that are set up to defend the 
Shrine and its principles.  
Pacific War Museums
53
 
Yūshūkan War Museum  
 The Yūshūkan War Museum is the controversial museum on the grounds of the 
Yasukuni Shrine, in which a revisionist reading of Japanese history is presented, that is 
deeply contested within and outside Japan. Critics argue that the Yūshūkan War Museum 
glorifies Japan's past, whitewashes the atrocities the Japanese military committed during 
World War II, and present a vision of Japanese history that is both absurd and offensive. 
On the other hand, supporters of the museum argue that the museum is a correct 
representation of Japan's past and its purpose is to counter the masochistic view of 
history, which many Japanese nationalists believe dominates the current historical 
narrative of Japan.  
 One of the oldest museums in Japan, the Yūshūkan War Museum was constructed 
in 1882, damaged in the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake, and then rebuilt and reopened in 
1931. The Yūshūkan War Museum was closed after Japan's defeat in 1945 and was not 
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reopened to the public until 1986 after extensive renovation. The first room contains an 
oil painting of Emperor Hirohito visiting the Yasukuni Shrine in the 1930s, immediately 
connecting the museum to the Imperial Family.
54 
Relics, such as a sacred sword, a 'human 
torpedo,' battle flags, and blood stained and torn uniforms, are displayed throughout the 
museum to testify to the glorification of the war and the centrality of the emperor system. 
Throughout the exhibits, the Japanese army is depicted as Asian liberators; the most 
glaring example of this vindicating narrative is in the display of a Burmese flag that was 
presented to Japan by General Ne Win, the Burmese military dictator, who trained in 
Japan.
55
 The caption explains that the flag was given by ―one who owes the liberation of 
his country to Japan,‖ this flag only represents a one-sided version of Japan‘s actions in 
Asia, yet at the Yūshūkan War Museum it is intended to symbolize the entirety of the war 
in Asia.
56
  
 The Yūshūkan War Museum was renovated in 2002. Toward the end of 2006, 
historian Jeff Kingston was struck by ―how terrorism is invoked to justify the Imperial 
Army's rampage through China back in the 1930s and 40s.‖ He argues: ―this is a post 
9/11 museum...we learn that Japan was fighting against Chinese ‗terrorists.‘‖57 
Unsurprisingly, there is no mention of the atrocities committed by Japanese troops.
58 
Instead, the Yūshūkan War Museum asserts that the Japanese actions in the war were 
                                                 
54
 French, ―Tokyo Journal.‖ The renovation cost 4 billion yen ($33 million). Greimel, ―From Kamikaze 
to Suicide Subs.‖ 
55
 Jeans, 152. 
56
 As John Dower points out, Japan only invaded colonial outposts in southern Asia that had been 
dominated by Westerners for generations. In November 1943 at the Assembly of the Greater East Asiatic 
Nations in Tokyo a succession of Asian leaders voiced support for Japan in the war against the West. 
However, soon after the support for Japan evaporated as other Asian nations discovered that Pan-Asian 
unity was a myth and they began to be brutally exploited by the Japanese.  John Dower, War Without 
Mercy, 5-8.  
57
 Kingston, 302. 
58
 Kingston, 302.  
23 
 
noble, and developed out of a misunderstanding between the Japanese and Americans 
that eventually led the US to put an embargo on resource-poor Japan. This led to great 
suffering among the Japanese and forced them to defend themselves. Throughout the 
museum there is a noticeable absence of a discussion or acknowledgement of the 
Chinese, Korean, or Western victims of Japan's aggression. By not mentioning Japan's 
own victims, those at the Yūshūkan War Museum are furthering a narrative that justifies 
and glorifies the Asia-Pacific War. 
 In my own visit to Yasukuni in the spring of 2008, I was most struck by the 
monument to Justice Radhabinod Pal, who wrote the dissenting opinion at the Tokyo 
War Crimes Trials that argues for the innocence of the Japanese war criminals.
 
The 
monument reads, ―We hereby honour the courage and passion of Dr. Pal who remained 
true to legal justice and historical truth.‖ Justice Pal argued, ―As a judicial tribunal we 
cannot behave in any manner which may justify the feeling that the setting up of the 
tribunal was only for the attainment of an objective which was essentially political, 
though cloaked by a juridical appearance.‖59 In this statement Justice Pal is asserting 
that no just ruling can be made at the Tokyo Trials because the trials were merely a 
means for the victors to achieve vengeance over the Japanese. But, this argument does 
not claim that the atrocities and crimes against humanity for which the defendants were 
being tried were untrue, in fact Justice Pal acknowledged the Nanjing massacre.
60 
However, Justice Pal‘s dissenting opinion has been warped by nationalists in Japan to 
assert that the real aggressors in the Asia-Pacific War were the Americans. Justice Pal‘s 
true intent was to point out the hypocrisy in the trial not pass judgment on the 
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Americans. The caption beside Justice Pal‘s photograph in the Yūshūkan War Museum 
reads:  
If you read my history, you will know that the Americans and British are the 
loathsome instigators of aggression against Asia. However many Japanese 
intellectuals do not read what I have to say. This is why they tell their students 
that Japan was guilty of war crimes and that Japan launched a war of aggression 
against Asia.
61
 
 
 Justice Radhabinod Pal‘s dissenting opinion at the Tokyo Trials, which victimizes 
Japan, has been paraded around by nationalists as the appropriate lens through which to 
view Japan‘s wartime history. The ideals of the same nationalists are embodied in the 
Yūshūkan War Museum, which attempts to evoke a ―one sided, exculpatory narrative‖ 
that obscures any discussion of war guilt and is offensive to other Asians and the majority 
of Japanese citizens who do not agree with the nationalistic war narrative.
62
 In addition, 
by only discussing the victimized narrative, the nationalists are effectively blocking out 
any reasonable discourse over Japan's war memory that could result in a constructive 
move forward.    
Chiran Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots 
 The Chiran Peace Museum opened in 1975 on the site of the former Chiran Air 
Base located on the southern tip of Kyushu in the Kagoshima Prefecture. Chiran served 
as the main kamikaze base for Japanese Army attacks on Allied ships around Okinawa.
63
 
On average over 2,000 people visit the museum per day. Although this museum is 
classified by the Japanese Network of Museums for Peace as a ―peace museum,‖ its 
purpose and content suggest that it is more concerned with glorifying the kamikaze pilots' 
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role in World War II than with promoting peace.  
 The museum is divided into four exhibition rooms. A museum guide gives a 30-
minute talk several times a day in the main exhibition hall that is filled with individual 
photos and personal information of 1,036 kamikaze pilots arranged by date of death.
64
 
This area of the Chiran Peace Museum has letters, diaries, thousand-stitch sashes 
(senninbari), and other writings displayed throughout the rooms in 16 display cases. The 
other three exhibition rooms have less organization and many more miscellaneous items 
than the main hall. In addition the photos and items in other rooms are only indentified 
with a simply label, and much of the historical context of their use and purpose is lost. 
The museum contains an assortment of torn Army and Navy uniforms, numerous 
miscellaneous wartime items not directly connected to kamikaze pilots, and a wide 
variety of books, articles, photos, and models in no particular order.  
 Ian Buruma writes a powerful account of the Chiran Peace Museum in The Wages 
of Guilt, a book which uncovers and compares war memory in post-war Germany and 
Japan. Buruma explains that the museum is unbearably moving; the heart-wrenching 
farewell letters of young men going to their death, thousand-stitch sashes, and bits of 
blown up planes reveal ―the tragedy of wasted life.‖65 However, as Buruma says, ―What 
is so awful about the memory of their deaths is the cloying sentimentality that was meant 
to justify their self-immolation…It was the exploitation of their youthful idealism that has 
made it such a wicked enterprise.‖66 The horror of the exploitation of the young kamikaze 
pilots is lost in the Chiran Peace Museum.  
 The message of the Chiran Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots is that while war 
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is bad, the sacrifice that these young men made for peace and prosperity was noble. 
Buruma points to the caption of a photograph of a merry group of pilots ready for takeoff 
that reads, ―There is great beauty in the laughing faces of these men just before facing 
certain death.‖67 The romanticized conception of suicide perpetuated throughout the 
Chiran Peace Museum takes away from its own assertion as a peace museum. Instead, it 
exemplifies the ―faith in the ideals upon which was propaganda has always been based—
sacrifice, sincerity, the sacred cause—was too deep to shake.‖68 
Showa Hall (Shōwakan)69  
 Showa Hall was completed in 1999; twenty years after the first proposals for its 
construction were made. The other museums already discussed are either run privately 
(Yūshūkan War Museum) or by local governments (Chiran Peace Museum). Showa Hall 
was the Japanese government's first attempt to officially memorialize the war; this 
distinction makes the Hall‘s construction, purpose and content all the more important. 
The Hall is located in Tokyo near the Diet, Supreme Court, most ministries, and the 
Imperial Palace. Furthermore, Showa Hall is only a few minutes‘ walk from the 
Yūshūkan War Museum; their ―proximity creates a problematic set of overlapping 
narratives about the war and its legacy.‖70  
 The Hall originated from within the politically well-connected group, the Japan 
Association of Bereaved Families (Nihon izokukai), which lobbied the state in the 1980s 
to fund a national memorial for the Japanese war dead and their families. The initial 
planning, design and content development of the museum was done behind closed doors 
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and overseen by the Ministry of Health and Welfare. A broad range of people participated 
in the development of the Hall, including representatives of each of Japan's major 
newspapers, executives in the corporate and non-profit sectors, academics, an architect, a 
graphic designer, and a library specialist, to name a few.
71 
However, the diverse 
backgrounds of the Hall‘s design and development committees could not prevent the 
Japan Association of Bereaved Families from maintaining a major role in deciding the 
overarching ideology of the new museum.  
 The Japan Association of Bereaved Families argued that ―those orphans whose 
fathers were sacrificed for the nation have come this far through very trying 
circumstances without a single national institution [to support them]. Given that, the state 
should perform some act of consolation on their behalf.‖72 In essence, they wanted the 
government to construct a museum to memorialize and instruct in the correct history of 
the war. The correct view of history for the Japan Association of Bereaved Families is 
that the Greater East Asian War was fought to liberate Asia, a war that Japan, due to their 
economic isolation, was forced to fight.  
 Although the Japan Association of Bereaved Families was clear about what they 
wanted the museum to be, it still took two decades to plan and construct Showa Hall 
during which time the design and content were altered many times. When the first 
designs of the present day Hall emerged in 1992 it was called the War Dead Peace 
Memorial Hall (Senbotsusha Tsuitō Heiwa Kinen-kan). This Hall was entirely focused on 
describing the hardship of war in terms of Japanese suffering. Kerry Smith quotes the 
planners of the War Dead Peace Memorial Hall, who noted that the ―major goal was to 
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acknowledge 'the loss of some three million lives' during the war.‖73 The Ministry of 
Health and Welfare estimated the number of deaths from the war to be about three 
million, this number only includes the Japanese who died at home and abroad, excluding 
the casualties experienced by all other nations. Public scrutiny of the plans for the Hall 
generated considerable criticism from those who were excluded from the official 
planning process. The concerns brought to the Ministry of Health and Welfare were fairly 
obvious; people demanded transparency in the planning and approval process, 
disapproved of the collusion between the Ministry and the Japan Association of Bereaved 
Families, and argued that a one-sided perspective of the war experience would diminish 
relations with neighbors and distort history. 
 The Showa Hall that opened in 1999 was very different than the one the Japan 
Association of Bereaved Families and the Ministry of Health had envisioned. In order to 
get past the public criticism and begin building, the planners of the Hall chose to drop 
any reference to the Japanese military and the war in Asia. Therefore, the exhibits in 
Showa Hall primarily focus on the hardship of the citizens (particularly women and 
children) during the war era through the display of clothing and household items, but 
there is no reference to the war or the origin of the peoples‘ suffering. The Hall‘s ―failure 
to engage…questions about the war‘s causes, the conflict legacies, and Japan‘s conduct‖ 
has sparked wide criticism from the right and left.
74
 The Ministry of Health created a 
museum that they thought was safe and not contentious; however in the process they have 
silenced the majority of the wartime narrative and squandered the opportunity to create a 
meaningful national museum to the war.  
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Conclusion  
 Ueyama Shumpei, an influential historian, argues ―each historical perspective is 
linked with a particular national authority and reflects its interest, there is, accordingly, no 
overarching universal truth and justice beyond nationally circumscribed politico-legal 
systems,‖75 While there may never be an entirely agreed upon war narrative, it is 
imperative to at least attempt to learn from all sides of history, since the remembering (or 
forgetting) of the war experience shapes Japan's relationships with other nations. The 
national wartime narrative promulgated by conservatives and nationalists in the New 
History Textbook and War Museums is artfully constructed for domestic consumption. 
The museums, textbooks, and Shrine evoke themes of sacrifice, struggle, suffering, and 
citizenship to connect the wartime history with the present day. Within this narrative, the 
military and citizens are portrayed as noble and patriotic without a qualifying statement 
about why they all believed so strongly in the war. The indoctrination of loyalty and 
patriotism that began in the Meiji Era and continued until 1945 is not evaluated or 
questioned, which leaves out an integral lesson about the war in the collective narrative.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
75
 Quoted in Iida, 139.  
30 
 
Section II: Patriotic Education 
 
 Since the mid 1990s, right wing members of the LDP have successfully 
implemented reforms in the Japanese educational system that have increased its focus on 
patriotism. The LDP has argued that there has been a deterioration of Japanese traditional 
society and an increase in social problems that have resulted from a lack of solidarity and 
shared identity among Japanese students. In order to fix these issues, the LDP has 
prescribed patriotic education in primary and secondary schools. Although the Japanese 
left wing has tried to oppose these policies, the widespread anxiety over Japan‘s social 
problems and the rise of a new generation that is entirely detached from the consquences 
of patriotic education has rendered the opposition ineffective. The content of Japan‘s late 
20
th
 century patriotic education can be seen as parallel to the moral-political foundations 
of the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890, and the pre-war and wartime ideology on 
education. 
The Rescript on Education was an edict that came down directly from Emperor 
Meiji. It states that ―our subjects‖ should ―advance public good and promote common 
interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, 
offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of 
Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth.‖76 The Rescript was read aloud at all 
important school events and students were required to study and memorize it. The 
purpose of the Rescript was to reinforce the bond between the emperor and the citizens 
by promoting loyalty and filial piety through education. Although, the Rescript on 
Education was rescinded by the Diet in 1948 at the insistence of the American occupying 
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forces, its ability to mobilize the masses and inspire fervent loyalty in the Japanese 
toward the emperor shows the strength of its legacy and ideology.
77
  
 It is commonly assumed that from the end of World War II to the mid 1990s, Japan 
accepted its new pacifist stance as a result of the total destruction inflicted on the 
Japanese during the war and their subsequent antiwar constitution. The recent emergence 
of ―neo-nationalism‖ is generally recognized as a reaction to the failing economy and the 
lack of purpose in Japan‘s consumer-driven society. However, many of the alarming 
reforms recently altering the Japanese educational system have been advocated by 
conservative and neo-nationalists since the end of the American occupation in 1952. This 
section argues that the sudden success of conservative reform in education, including the 
changing of the Fundamental Law of Education (2006), the implementation of 
―Notebooks for Moral Education‖ (Kokoro no nōto, 2002), and the enactment of the law 
offically recognizing the Hinomaru and Kimigayo as national symbols (1999), have 
arisen due to the widespread fear of social collaspe that has been prepetuated by right-
wing conservatives and nationalists within the LDP since the mid 1990s.   
Ministry of Education 
 The Ministry of Education (MoE) has taken a decisive role in supporting the 
implementation of patriotic education in Japanese primary and secondary schools. Their 
website offers a statement on the current status of education in Japan and the challenges 
they face in the future.
78
 The opening section summarizes the official rationale behind 
patriotic education. It alludes to the deterioration of Japanese traditional society and 
alleges that there is a dramatic increase in social problems that can only be fixed by 
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focusing on moral education. Although most people would acknowledge that Japanese 
society is transforming, the assumption that these social changes are a new phenomena or 
the sign of true problems is open for debate. The MoE statement on the current education 
in Japan cites ―weakened educational functions of families and local communities,‖ 
―children's declining motivation to learn,‖ ―falling academic performance,‖ and 
―increasing problem behaviors‖ as the primary problems in Japanese schools.79 The 
conservative ideology behind the MoE‘s statement blames these problems in primary and 
secondary education for broader societal issue such as the ―falling birth rates,‖ ―excessive 
pursuit of economic efficiency or convenience, weakened social ties and spread of 
undesirable 'individualism' or 'me-ism.'‖80 The MoE argues that the only way to correct 
the present social crisis in Japan is to ―turn to inner values, such as the pleasure of living 
in harmony with other people and the importance of morals for such harmonization.‖81 
Moral education, they believe, will recover Japanese youths' sense of responsibility, 
justice, and ambition.  
 Although the Ministry of Education's explanation of problems in primary and 
secondary education is very general, they hint at a few specific issues seen in schools and 
among youth in Japan. The phenomena of classroom collapse (gakkyū hōkai), school 
refusal (tōkō kyohi), and the increase of violence (kōnai bōryoku), and bullying (ijime) in 
schools have become increasingly alarming to the public over the past two decades.
82
 The 
anxiety over these incidents is characterized best by the Sakakibara Seito murders in 
1997, when a 14-year-old student from Kobe beheaded an 11-year-old mentally 
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handicapped boy with a handsaw and left the head at the entrance to his special school, 
and then confessed to another murder of a 10-year-old girl. In addition, the media frenzy 
over the supposedly large number of middle and high school girls engaged in enjo kōsai 
(compensated dating) in order to buy high end consumer products, has highlighted the 
fear of moral degradation.
83
 These dissolute behaviors among youths are seen as the 
catalyst for the breakup of post-war societal values. 
As stated on the MoE website, the broader social currents that they are trying to 
reverse are the declining population/birth rates, the increase in part-time and freelance 
jobs, and the declining motivation of youths in higher education. The declining 
population can be attributed to women delaying marriage, couples waiting longer to have 
children, and couples only having one child. These new trends have been blamed on 
selfish Japanese singles who live with their parents past the normal marrying age and 
hence have perpetuated the decline in family values.
84
 Many conservatives accuse the 
new generation of freeters of refusing to accept responsibility for themselves and their 
lack of motivation in seeking regular employment.
85
 Although these trends in Japanese 
society may cause broader social and educational problems, the MoE offers no 
explanation of how they will be fixed by a moral education, and refuses to explore other 
possible causes of these issues.   
 The MoE‘s only answer for the shift in values, such as loyalty and respect, from 
the state/family to the individual is the perceived lack of morals in the nation‘s youth. 
However, there are other explanations for Japan‘s transforming society that do not 
revolve around specific social groups but rather focus on the big-picture institutions and 
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ideology within Japan. Kelly and White argue that the concept of family has played an 
especially strategic role in modern Japan. The recent critiques on Japanese society ―often 
tend to ignore the family unit itself as a social force and focus on the elements of families 
– youth, women and the elderly in particular – as paradoxically putting the families to 
which they belong at risk.‖86 Instead of taking a look at institutions and ideas that make 
up the family unit that is Japan, politicians and institutions are focused on the students, 
singles, and slackers who deviate from the standard model.  
 The MoE overlooks other institutions and social prejudices, such as the intense 
competition in elite schools and emphasis on conformity that may contribute to the 
increasing problems in school. The ―educational arms race,‖ described by Kelly and 
White, puts an extraordinary amount of emphasis on gaining admission into a limited 
number of prestigious educational institutes.
87
 In Japan the only avenue to the upper 
echelons of business and professional society is graduation from one of the few high-
status universities, which can only be achieved by passing rigorous entrance 
examinations.
88
 This system has forced out students who don't have the ability to pay for 
private secondary education, additional classes, or tutoring from the best universities, 
creating apathy among many youth who might have had the potential to be successful 
members of society. Additionally, the pressure of examinations dominates family life; it 
limits the time that families can spend together, children can play, and forces parents to 
push their children hard if they want them to succeed.
89
 This could be another cause of 
broken family ties and changing importance of the family unit in society. Furthermore, 
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school violence and bullying (ijime) can be attributed to a lack of understanding and 
acceptance of people who are different.
90 
Rather than blaming the youth for Japan's 
problems, conservative might be better served by correcting a corrupt political system, 
ensuring equal opportunities in education and careers, and encouraging the acceptance of 
differences among the nation‘s citizens.  
Fundamental Law of Education  
 The Fundamental Law of Education (FLE) was designed by the U.S. occupation 
forces and became law on March 31, 1947. Its purpose was to clearly state the goals of 
Japanese education and the basic principles that should govern the educational 
institutions. The American occupational authorities were concerned with the militaristic 
and nationalistic overtones in the pre-war Japanese education system. Therefore they 
created the FLE in an effort to democratize Japan by instituting a democratic and 
individual centered ideology in education. The original FLE makes an explicit reference 
to the Constitution in its Preamble, connecting it with the Constitution and asserting that 
it has the same authority in the realm of education. Furthermore, the original FLE states 
that the aim of education is ―the full development of personality, striving for the rearing 
of the people, sound in mind and body, who shall love truth and justice, esteem individual 
value, respect labor and have a deep sense of responsibility, and be imbued with an 
independent spirit, as builders of the peaceful state and society.‖91 The statement above is 
focused heavily on individuality, which was removed from the revised FLE that came 
into effect in 2006. Another key provision of the original FLE is in Article 10:  
―education should not be subject to improper control, but it shall be directly responsible 
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to the whole people.‖92 This was added to ensure that the Japanese education system 
could not be used abusively or controlled by ultra-nationalist or militarist factions. The 
Fundamental Law of Education was intended by the occupational authorities to instill an 
irrevocable departure from the educational tradition of pre-war Japan and to mold the 
emerging values and ideology of a new Japan.  
 Throughout the post-war era many conservative Japanese politicians have pushed 
for revision of the FLE, most notably Prime Minister Nakasone in the 1980s, but it was 
not a top item on the LDP political agenda until the election of Prime Minister Obuchi 
Keizō in 1998. He viewed the educational system as a foreign imposition on Japan that 
failed to champion traditional Japanese values.
93
 Furthermore, the foreign educational 
system seemed to place too much emphasis on individuality and lacked an assertion of 
the importance of Japanese traditional morality and values; such as filial piety and loyalty 
to the State.
94
 Therefore PM Obuchi set up the Education Reform National Conference 
(ERNC, Kyōiku kaikaku kokumin kaigi) to quickly develop a reform agenda. Although 
the problems discussed above, such as the examination competition, school refusals, and 
bullying, should have been the foremost concerns, the panel chose to focus its efforts on a 
proposal for revising the FLE. On December 22, 2000, the panel released its core 
recommendations for education reform. They were 1) Revision of the FLE; 2) re-
examination of history textbooks and the introduction of 'new perspectives' into Japanese 
history; 3) Introduction of 'voluntary activities' for all students from elementary to high 
school; 4) an increased emphasis on moral education; 5) reform of the 6-3-3-4 system and 
establishment of a diversified education system which is suited to each individuals' 
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different abilities; 6) recommendation of 'special education measures' that would allow 
gifted upper secondary school students to experience university-level education research 
in a scientific field.
95
 The first four recommendations clearly represent the patriotic 
educational aims of neo-nationalists, where as the last two suggestions are more focused 
on maintaining Japanese power through identifying and developing potential in Japanese 
students at a young age.  
 In 2006 the Fundamental Law of Education was revised and it transformed the 
previous notion of ―education for citizens‖ to ―education of national subjects.‖ The 
reference to the Constitution was taken out of the Preamble and replaced by ―public 
spirit‖ and ―inheritance of tradition,‖ which critics argue disassociates the new law from 
the post-war Constitution.
96
 The wording of the Aims of Education was changed to 
―Education shall aim for the total development of personality and strive to nurture people 
sound in mind and body who are imbued with the qualities necessary for the builders of a 
peaceful and democratic state and society.‖97 The removal of any allusion to individuality 
in the revised aims can be regarded as the LDP attempting to promote tradition and 
patriotism at the expensive of freedom and individual rights. The last significant revision 
is of Article 10 that said education ―shall be directly responsible to the whole people,‖ but 
has been changed to ―on the basis of what this law and other laws stipulate.‖98 The 
previous wording of Article 10 alluded to the state's potential improper control over the 
education system, whereas the revised article has changed the agent of improper control 
to ―those who engage in teaching in violation of the revised FLE and related education 
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laws.‖99 The revisions in the 2006 Fundamental Law of Education mandated that the FLE 
is not empowered by the Constitution, the importance of individualism should be 
removed from the classroom, and that the teachers and administrators, rather than the 
state, are seen as a vehicle of improper control in education. This stems back to the 
MoE‘s long standing, combative relationship between the teacher‘s union over the 
union‘s leftist views and criticism of the LDP‘s education policies. These reforms give 
the ruling party and the MoE more direct power over the ideologies, values, and beliefs 
taught in Japanese schools, which may be instrumental in forming the next generation‘s 
political views.  
 The revision of the FLE may also be an indicator of other constitutional revisions 
in the future. Since the FLE was a legacy of World War II and imposed by the occupation 
authorities, the LDP claimed that it was outdated, not in the interest of the Japanese 
people, and invalid. This is a short step away from suggesting that the Japanese 
constitution should also be revised. The revision of Article 9, as I discuss in the following 
section, is the most controversial aspect of the Japanese constitution and would undo the 
policy of pacifism that has been at a foundation of Japanese society for the past 50 years.  
Notebooks for Moral Education 
 In 2002 the national Study Course, the MoE‘s regular review of the national 
curriculum standards, added the cultivation of kuni o aisuru shinjō, or ―feelings of love 
for the nation,‖ to the 6th grade social studies objectives.100 In order to meet the course 
objective the MoE produced ―Notebooks for Moral Education‖ (Kokoro no nōto, literally 
―Notebook for the Heart‖, but translated by the Ministry of Education as ―Notebooks for 
                                                 
99
 Takayama, 138.  
100
 Takayama, 135.  
39 
 
Moral Education‖) as a teaching aid for moral education in primary and middle 
schools.
101
 There are 4 levels of moral education books; three for the primary grades and 
one for the middle schools.  The books all have the same four sections, but their 
complexity increases as the students advance through the grades.  ―Notebooks for Moral 
Education‖ ―discusses four moral issues; self reflection, relationships with other people, 
respect to nature and religious-like values, and obligations to society.‖102 This supplement 
suggests that patriotism is not only important for proper cultivation of one's own life, but 
it is necessary to be a productive member of society.  
 Although these books have been well received in some areas, there are many 
controversial aspects to ―Notebooks for Moral Education‘s‖ distribution and content. 
First, the MoE was careful not to classify ―Notebooks for Moral Education‖ as a textbook 
since then it would be required to go through the regular screening process and the local 
school boards would have control over whether to include it in their curriculum.
103
 As of 
now, the supplement is being distributed without going through the democratic process 
required for all textbooks. Secondly, the section that deals with groups and society is seen 
as problematic because it argues that the love of one‘s family expands to encompass the 
entire country. This implies that it is healthy and natural to feel the same love toward your 
parents, siblings, and children, as you feel toward the state. The extension of familial love 
can be seen as an attempt to revive a pre-war era of blind devotion to the nation.  Thirdly, 
―Notebooks for Moral Education‖ is reminiscent of the pre-war and wartime textbooks 
called Shūshin that instructed students in moral education. Although the alleged purpose 
of Shūshin was to teach the ―way of being human,‖ through the cultivation of conscience 
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and virtue, in actuality the textbooks focused on ―enthusiastic reverence for the emperor, 
patriotism, and responsibility to the state.‖104 The fear among critics is that, like Shūshin, 
“Notebooks for Moral Education‖ will eventually be used to subtly indoctrinate children 
with patriotic values that will justify the state's growing control over the private side of 
people‘s lives.  
 Since its inclusion in the education curriculum, ―Notebooks for Moral Education‖ 
has been revamped and revised to reflect the new guidelines stipulated in the revised 
Fundamental Law of Education. The new exercise books have been expanded from an 
average of 8 pages to16 pages to include a new topic focusing on the virtue of diligence 
and to give students more room to take notes.
105
 Overall, this supplemental text, whose 
merits and purpose have yet to be openly debated, is clearly an attempt by the LDP and 
other nationalists to encourage patriotic thinking, along conservative guidelines, among 
Japanese students. 
Hinomaru and Kimigayo 
 On August 13, 1999, the Japanese government enacted a Law Concerning the 
National Flag and National Anthem (Proclamation No. 127, 1999) that designated the 
Hinomaru and Kimigayo as national symbols. The law was introduced in March 1999 and 
was debated in the Diet for six months before its enactment. Although doubts about this 
law were voiced strongly, it ended up receiving an overwhelming majority, passing with a 
vote of 403 to 86 (with the LDP, CGP, and Liberal Party voting unanimously for it and 
the Communists Party and Social Party voting unanimously against it).
106
 This law was 
precipitated by the suicide of a Hiroshima high school principal in February 1999, who 
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was ―caught between the Ministry of Education, steadily increasing pressure to makes 
schools structure their ceremonies around the flag and anthem, and the teachers, students, 
and parents who resisted.‖107 This act represents a definitive step towards unifying the 
Japanese people via national symbols that have represented Japan in official and 
unofficial capacities since the late 19
th
 century.  
At the end of World War II, the American occupiers forbid Japan from flying its 
flag or singing the national anthem. But after the occupation ended in 1952, the 
Hinomaru was displayed on public building and at public ceremonies and the melody of 
Kimigayo was often played, even though the words were not always sung.
108
 By 1958, 
the MoE was already encouraging teachers to use the Hinomaru and Kimigayo in public 
school ceremonies. Until 1999, the MoE continued to strongly advise the use of these 
unofficial national symbols in school ceremonies, but since there was no legal basis for 
their use and the Japan Teachers Union was strongly opposed, there were many incidents 
of non-observance and acts of defiance in schools. Conservative politicians and school 
administrators believe that incorporating the Kimigayo and Hinomaru into school rituals 
will teach students patriotism and respect for their country. But, left-leaning teachers 
associate the flag with the extreme nationalism and militarism experienced in pre-war and 
wartime Japan.  
 The Hinomaru unmistakably represents the centrality of the Rising Sun and the 
lyrics of Kimigayo celebrate the longevity and everlasting reign of the emperor.
 109
 These 
imperial references bring up serious concerns about the ability of these symbols to 
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appropriately represent Japan as a democratic nation. Some Japanese nationalists, and a 
few unaffiliated citizens, argue that it is absurd to associate these symbols with militarism 
and that the reintroduction of the Hinomaru and Kimigayo is merely an attempt to create 
a normal and patriotic Japan.
110
 However, it is important to recognize that the debate over 
the national flag and anthem is not just a national debate between conservatives and 
liberals, but extends internationally, especially among other East Asian countries. Since 
Japan, unlike Italy and Germany, did not change their flag after World War II, the 
Hinomaru remains for many people in the neighboring countries (Korea, China, Taiwan, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines) a reminder of many painful years of repression, 
subjugation, and forced Japanization.
111
 Additionally, this act is reminiscent of the Meiji 
government's policies of patriotic education that encouraged the devotion of the Japanese 
people to these national symbols.
112
  
 The bill that passed in 1999 designated the Hinomaru and Kimigayo as official 
national symbols, but it failed to specify that observance of the national flag and anthem 
was mandatory or when they should be used.
113
 The lack of specificity of the law allowed 
school boards and individual institutions to use their own discretion when implementing 
the use of the national flag and anthem. Therefore, in October 2003 the Tokyo municipal 
government made respecting these national symbols compulsory at commencement and 
graduation ceremonies. This law was undoubtedly influenced by Tokyo governor, 
Ishihara Shintarō, an outspoken nationalist who hoped to encourage other districts to 
mandate the singing of Kimigayo. The regulation pronounced that the national flag must 
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be raised in front of the stage and the students and teachers must rise to face the flag and 
sing the anthem. Any teacher that refused to stand for the anthem was noted and could be 
punished with a transfer to new schools, pay cut, fine, or suspension.  
Resistance 
 Resistance to patriotic education has been primarily taken up by individual 
educators and the teachers' unions, whose membership (and influence) has decreased by 
half since the 1950s.
114
 Hiroshima and Okinawa experienced the strongest resistance to 
the incorporation of the Hinomaru and Kimigayo in school ceremonies. In March 2000 
the entire graduating class of a high school in Hiroshima sat silently protesting the 
performance of Kimigayo only to explode into a great applause when it finished.
115
 In 
1998 the MoE released a survey showing that 84% of public schools in Tokyo raised the 
Hinomaru, but only 3.9% of them sung Kimigayo; this was the lowest rate of compliance 
in all of Japan.
116
 Although the percentage of Tokyo public schools that used the 
Hinomaru in school ceremonies in 1999 may seem high, the low percentage of schools 
that sang Kimigayo is striking. The action of singing Kimigayo was transformed into a 
platform for the Japanese to express their opinion on the law publically, whereas hanging 
the Hinomaru did not represent an individuals‘ belief. Therefore, the small number of 
people that sang the Kimigayo in Tokyo indicates that most people were uncomfortable 
with the anthem‘s implementation. By 2001, after the formation of the Metropolitan 
School Graduation and Entrance Ceremony Countermeasures Section, the Metropolitan 
Board of Education notified all principals of the expectations surrounding school 
ceremonies, and the flag was raised and the anthem was sung at every public school in 
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Tokyo. Additionally, since 2000, the Japanese courts have almost unanimously supported 
the school administration's power to force teachers and staff members to sing Kimigayo 
and discipline them if they refuse. From 2000 to 2005, 875 teachers throughout Japan 
were disciplined for refusing to stand and sing the national anthem.
117
 While 875 teachers 
may seem like a significant number of protesters it is only .001% of all the teachers in 
Japan, suggesting that their support was very limited.
118
 
 The one exception to these rulings came in 2006 when a Tokyo District Court 
judge ruled that 401 teachers in Tokyo public schools were not required by duty to stand 
up and sing the national anthem at public school ceremonies.
119
 This decision argued that 
the Tokyo municipal government's order to make teachers stand and sing violated their 
freedom of conscience, which is guaranteed by Article 19 of the Japanese Constitution. 
The basis for all the rulings against teachers and staff members is that Japanese public 
employees are subject to more restraints on their constitutional rights than ordinary 
citizens, due to the public welfare doctrine.
120
 This principle asserts that public servants 
must seem to be politically neutral to benefit the whole community. Last year, the Tokyo 
High Court ruled against 172 teachers and staff members who were demanding 
compensation in damages and a reversal of their 2004 punishments for refusing to sing 
the national anthem.
121
 This suggest that the Tokyo High Court is following the precedent 
set by the Supreme Court's decision in 2007 against a music teacher who refused to 
accompany the anthem on the piano.
122
 The ruling of the Tokyo High Court is particularly 
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significant because it was the first time that they have ruled on a case that debated the 
right to freedom of conscience of Japanese government employees. This suggests, based 
on the decision against the Tokyo school teachers in 2009, that the Tokyo High Court will 
not uphold the 2006 ruling by the Tokyo District Court in favor of the teachers.  
 In the wake of this definitive ruling against the much celebrated fight by the left 
wing in support of a teacher‘s right to freedom of conscious, articles have appeared which 
are searching for other acts of protests against patriotic education.
123
 But, thus far there 
has been no other successful continued resistance among Japanese people. Mostly what 
scholars are finding is a soft undercurrent of discomfort with conservative education 
policies that is manifested in fairly inconsequential forms of protest. The students who 
will graduate this year have stood in front of the Hinomaru and sung Kimigayo in school 
since they were eight years old and the teachers and administrators who in the past 
protested have either left, been forced out, or submitted to the Japanese government‘s 
increased control over education. Therefore, the current trends actually suggest that 
patriotic education is becoming widely accepted as a societal norm, with little indication 
of being overturned in the near future.   
 As educators began to realize that their refusal to stand and sing during the 
national anthem would only result in personal injury, they began to search for other 
means of protest. Many teachers and students began to stand and move their mouths to 
the Kimigayo during school ceremonies but refused to actively sing. This led the MoE to 
measure the volume of the national anthem at schools and reprimanding those schools 
who sang too softly. In 2006 an English parody of Kimigayo called ―Kiss Me‖ emerged 
on the internet and spread rapidly across Japan. It was reportedly sung by students and 
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teachers at school ceremonies in late May 2006. This new song takes the syllables of the 
Japanese lyrics and turns them into phonetically similar English words, allowing 
dissenting singers to escape punishment. The lyrics of the parodied anthem are ―Kiss me, 
girl, your old one/ Till you‘re near, it is years till you‘re near / Sound of the dead will she 
know?/ She wants all told, now retained,/ For cold caves know the moon‘s seeing the 
mad and dead.‖124 It has been theorized that these lyrics refer to comfort women who 
were forced into prostitution by the Japanese during World War II.
125
   
 Furthermore, another scholar argues that more covert signs of resistance in the 
deviation from the traditional military band renditions of Kimigayo may serve to change 
the tone, reception, and, to some, the meaning of Japan's national anthem. Oba Junko 
asserts that unisonous collective singing (seishō) in Japanese schools, court music 
ensemble (gagaku) played in the 1999 Nagano Olympics' opening ceremony, and solo 
performances (dokushō) by celebrities ―'undid' Kimigayo and the collective voice it 
embodied in its sonority.‖126 The forced unisonous collective singing of Kimigayo has 
become a ritual at school ceremonies, therefore the singers are not regarded as endorsing 
the historical views and political stands that are associated with the song. At the Nagano 
Winter Olympics, the anthem was performed using a gagaku ensemble that was live 
onstage with a prerecorded Western orchestra. This arrangement ―liberated people‘s 
auditory system from the political charged reception of the song, to the new ear-opening 
experience of appreciating aesthetic values of Kimigayo.‖127 In addition to the new 
arrangement of the anthem at the Olympics, the idea of Kimigayo as a performance to 
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watch allowed the audience to remain passive listeners without getting involved in the 
collective singing. Similarly, the solo performances (dokushō) by celebrities at sporting 
events are primarily done to highlight the singer. Therefore, the incentive behind these 
solo acts are not patriotic or nationalist, but rather commercial. This process of 
―undoing,‖ which implies changing the meaning of the song for its singers and listeners, 
is not as progressive as constructing a new national anthem or rewriting the lyrics. But, in 
very specific situations, it does attempt to cancel or reverse the wartime connotation that 
Kimigayo carries for many Japanese.  
 These less public forms of protest have sparked some discussion over Japan‘s new 
space and forms of resistance. While these less overt forms of protest do exist, scholars‘ 
focus on them merely serves as a way to find resistance in a nation where formal protests 
and demonstration against the government have ceased to be part of the mainstream 
national culture. The enactment of the Law Concerning the National Flag and National 
Anthem forced the usually apathetic majority in Japan (with the exception of the mass 
mobilization in 2003 Iraq War protests that I will discuss in the next section) to express 
their opinions on the appropriateness of the Hinomaru and Kimigayo. Unfortunately the 
re-institutionalizing of pre-war and wartime national symbols did not inspire resistance 
against conservatives, who are slowly expanding the government‘s control over the lives 
of individual Japanese citizens. Instead, the law was commonly accepted and effectively 
moved the political spectrum to the right. The Law Concerning the National Flag and 
National Anthem, the distribution of ―Notebooks for Moral Education,‖ and the revision 
of the Fundamental Law of Education are attempts to inspire nationalism in students who 
have no connection to World War II, in order to create a unified national identity and, as I 
48 
 
will discuss in the next section, push through policies on rearmament.  
Conclusion 
Patrick Smith, a correspondent for The New Yorker, says that since Japan has 
made their national symbols official ―the rest of us are challenged to distinguish between 
the aggressive hubris of wartime nationalists and ordinary national pride. These lines 
were blurred after Japan‘s defeat when the U.S. occupation condemned the nationalist 
impulse.‖128 Since the end of World War II, nationalism has become an illegitimate point 
of identity in Japan, except for the right-wing and nationalist fringe. While proper 
national pride, especially in a nation‘s symbols, should be respected, Japan‘s government 
seems to have mandated patriotism for the people. The changes in the FLE, the 
introduction of ―Notebooks for Moral Education,‖ and the reinstitution of the national 
flag and anthem have been implemented in Japan forcefully and without a proper 
discussion of their broader social and political implications.  
These policies have fundamentally limited the freedom of speech within schools 
and have exponentially expanded the government‘s role in education. The movie 
"Against Coercion:" Refusing to Stand for Kimigayo, produced by Video Press Of Tokyo 
in 2006, shows the repression against Japanese teachers who refused to sing and stand for 
the Kimigayo at school ceremonies. One of the dissenting teachers, Ms. Nezu, discusses 
the treatment she received when trying to teach her classes about comfort women.  She 
said that parents and students ―jeered and shouted at me, reminding me of traitor-bashing 
during World War II. It was that terrible.‖129 Moreover, in describing her experiences 
resisting Kimigayo she explains that, ―my professional pride has been taken away. I can‘t 
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refuse to stand up unless I am ready to accept prejudice from students and 
parents.‖Although only the teachers are punished for not participating in the anthem, the 
government opposition against them is so overt that it is essentially indoctrinating 
students to stand and sing Kimigayo. These policies are furthering the Japanese 
construction of an ethnically and ideologically homogenous nation. The principles of 
national solidarity that a patriotic education encourages have little regard for 
individuality, which stamps out the possibility of widespread protest and by extension 
effective resistance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
Section III: Article 9 and the Post-War Constitution 
 
 
Article 9 of the post-war Constitution, demilitarizing Japan and placing it under 
the U.S. security umbrella, has provided the Japanese with decades of peace and 
prosperity that have come to be central to Japanese national identity. However, to many 
nationalists, this Constitution serves as a reminder of Japan‘s defeat in the Asia-Pacific 
War and the foreign occupation and forced restructuring that followed. On the 60
th
 
anniversary of the promulgation of the Constitution, Prime Minister Abe stated that 
―while we continue to uphold the fundamental principles of the present Constitution as 
abiding values, a bold review of the postwar regime all the way back to its origins and an 
in-depth discussion of the Constitution toward realizing a new Japan will lead to a spirit 
of laying the path to a new era.‖130 This speech showed PM Abe‘s definitive support for 
constitutional revision, an idea that has been on the LDP agenda since its formation, and 
continues to be central to their platform. In May 2007, the government moved closer to 
Abe‘s goal of constitutional revision by approving Abe‘s National Referendum Bill that 
set down the procedures for a referendum on constitutional amendments.
131
 This law does 
not come into force for 3 years, meaning Japan could be in the process of amending its 
post-war constitution in May 2010, with unknown effects on Japan‘s domestic and 
foreign relations.  
The impetus for constitutional revision has been in Japan since the end of the 
American occupation in 1952. Almost immediately, right-wing conservatives and 
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nationalists argued for constitutional revision, but their attempts were unsuccessful 
because amendments require approval by two-thirds of the Diet before they can be 
presented to the people in a referendum. In the early postwar years, not only did the leftist 
parties support the pacifist Constitution but most members of the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party saw the constitution as advantageous to securing their political power, 
making it nearly impossible for nationalists to secure a two-thirds vote. Yet, as the 
postwar political and economic system declined at the end of the 1980s, the support for 
constitutional revision grew. During the first Gulf War of 1991, there was a strong push 
from the conservatives in the Diet to overstep the bounds of the Constitution to send 
troops abroad. This movement was quickly stopped by the left-wing political groups and 
influential intellectuals in Japan. But at the onset of the Iraq war in 2003, the LDP was 
able to swiftly pass legislation to allow the SDF to provide support to US troops. During 
the twelve years that separated the two wars, the conservatives in Japan exploited a sense 
of fear among the Japanese people that arose from a perceived internal threat of 
foreigners and external threat of North Korea. These fears enabled the government to 
expand the scope of Article 9 and delegitimize any opposition to their radical new 
policies.  
Creation and Expansion of Article 9  
Japan‘s post-war Constitution was drafted in seven days by the Supreme 
Command for the Allied Powers (SCAP), who oversaw the U.S. occupation of Japan.
132
 
In the Constitution, SCAP focused on demilitarizing and democratizing Japan, and 
included Article 9 that forever renounced war by the Japanese. The Japanese government 
had no choice but to accept the SCAP Constitution, which was approved in May 1947. 
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Due to the SCAP‘s integral involvement in the development of Japan‘s current 
Constitution and its strict policy on demilitarization, conservatives have argued that this 
Constitution was imposed, does not represent Japan‘s desires, and should therefore be 
revised.  
Since the United States had essentially deprived Japan of any military capabilities, 
their security and defense was guaranteed though the occupation by the U.S. forces and 
afterward by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty signed in 1951. Beginning in the late 1940s, 
with the Communist victory in China in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 
1950, the U.S. preoccupation with and desire to contain Communism grew. Therefore, the 
United States initiated a reverse course in Japan and began to encourage the Japanese to 
build up defenses and create the Self Defense Force (SDF) in 1954.
133
 The SDF was 
supposed to be an exclusively defense-oriented force that would only be used if an attack 
was made on Japan, but over the years the scope of its operations has increased. The 
formation of the SDF caused liberals in the Diet to argue that the SDF was 
unconstitutional, a stance that was strongly supported by the majority of the Japanese 
public who had become hostile toward war.
134
 Additionally, the revision of the U.S.-Japan 
Security Treaty in 1960 extended the U.S. military‘s sphere of defense from Japan to all 
of the Far East. Since the treaty's revision in 1960, the role of the SDF in domestic and 
international conflicts remained limited and essentially the same until the 1990s.  
The reaction of the international community to Japan‘s lack of military personnel 
support in the 1991 Persian Gulf War set the stage for changing the role of the SDF. 
When President Bush condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Japanese government 
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was swift to announce a policy of sanctions against Iraq, and froze Kuwaiti assets, trade 
credit, and economic cooperation.
135
 But the LDP was unable to pass any legislation that 
would allow the Self-Defense Forces to contribute to the coalition due to the polarization 
of the right and left parties in the Diet. Additionally, the Japanese participation in the Gulf 
War incited strong resistance from prominent intellectuals and the majority of Japanese 
citizens.
136
 Although Japan ended up contributing almost $13 billion to the war (through a 
new tax), their lack of ground troops ended up excluding them from any recognition in 
the liberation of Kuwait.
137
 Japan's participation in the Persian Gulf War opened up a 
Constitutional debate over the legality of participating in war at any level. This factor, 
coupled with increased resentment of U.S. international policies, ―opened up the question 
of Japan's postwar relations with the US, Japan's responsibility to Asian nations, and the 
overall meaning of World War II.‖138 These questions triggered discussion over Japan's 
current position in the international system and anxiety over their status in the future 
multilateral international order. This led to conservative politicians speaking openly of 
Japan's need to become a ―normal nation‖ (futsū no kuni) by taking a more active role in 
international security; the following year the SDF participated in its first UN 
peacekeeping mission to Cambodia.
139
 The role of the SDF has continued to evolve, 
arguably outside the limits of Article 9. 
In September 1997, largely as a result of Japan‘s lack of military support in the 
Gulf War, Japan and the U.S adopted new guidelines for a U.S.-Japan Security Pact that 
authorized Japanese logistical support for U.S. military operations in areas surrounding 
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Japan.
140
 The problem with these new guidelines is that they are very ambiguous. Neither 
the situations in which Japan may support U.S. operations nor the boundaries of ―areas 
surrounding Japan‖ have been defined.141 The revised guidelines represent a new 
distribution of responsibility for defense and security between the U.S. and Japan. The 
U.S. is no longer just a protector of Japan. The security relationship between the two 
powers is changing to force the Japanese to take a more active role in their own defense 
and in the defense of U.S. policies and interests abroad. The expansion of the U.S.-Japan 
Security Pact may have broader effects on the possibility of amending the Japanese 
Constitution.  
By expanding the scope of the SDF forces, through the passage of the revised 
U.S.-Japan Security Pact, the LDP found a way to change the meaning of the Constitution 
without amending it, which effectively opened the floor for constitutional revision. Such 
sentiment has been expressed even by moderates like Hatoyama Yukio, the leader of the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and the current Prime Minister. After the revision of the 
U.S.-Japan Security Pact in 1997, Hatoyama argued that since Japan did maintain armed 
forces for defense (despite Article 9) that they should make it explicit in the 
Constitution.
142
 Hatoyama's stance on Article 9 exemplifies the shift in the mainstream 
opinion of the moderate parties of Japan, who previously opposed constitutional revision. 
This move towards the right has alienated the left-wing Communist and Socialist Parties, 
and primed the stage for constitutional revisionism. Furthermore, the critical point in this 
discussion is that even if Article 9 is not formally amended, the LDP has effectively 
changed its meaning without following the appropriate procedures for constitutional 
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revision. Hence the power and authority of the state to wage war has been immeasurably 
enhanced without going through the proper procedures.   
Emerging Fear  
According to polls conducted by the national press, support for the constitution 
has consistently outweighed dissatisfaction from the mid 1950s to 1990.
143
 But in the 
1990s, a shift occurred in the national perception of Japan‘s vulnerability to international 
and domestic threats that created a sense of fear and urgency among Japanese citizens. 
On the domestic level, the Japanese saw illegal immigration and illicit drug trafficking as 
the foremost problem in maintaining safety and the social order.
144
 Internationally, the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction and the aggression of North Korea were identified 
as the greatest threat to Japan‘s security.145 Japan‘s domestic security policies remain 
deeply rooted in the notion of Japanese homogeneity and uniqueness that should be 
defended in distinct ways. Many Japanese still see Japan as a society that can guarantee 
an exceptional amount of security to its citizens based on the homogeneity of its 
population.  
 However in the early 1990s Japan experienced a series of devastating political, 
economic, and social shocks to the Japanese perception of their government and society. 
The culmination of these internal problems transpired in 1995 when Japan experienced 
the Great Hanshin earthquake and the Aum Shinrikyō attack. The earthquake occurred in 
January and laid waste to the city of Kobe, killing over 6,000 people and leaving another 
300,000 homeless.
146
 It also caused major damage to the city's infrastructure, destroying 
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railroads, communications and the city's clean water supply. This all came as a shock to 
Japan, since Kobe was considered a no-risk zone for earthquakes. Perhaps because of the 
unexpectedness of the earthquake, the government response to the disaster was slow and 
ineffective. Additionally the Japanese government turned down foreign aid to maintain 
―national autonomy‖ at the expense of its citizens, and was so disorganized that the relief 
effort eventually fell to citizen groups and the Japanese organized crime (yakuza).  
 Before Japan had fully recovered from the Great Hanshin earthquake, in March 
the religious cult Aum Shinrikyō released the chemical agent sarin into the Tokyo subway 
system, injuring over 5,000 people. Aum Shinrikyō was founded in 1987 as an idealistic 
and optimistic religious organization, in which its members shared the belief that they 
needed to save society from the morally corrupt world to achieve enlightenment.
147 
Eventually the group
 
developed an explicitly apocalyptic vision in which a third world 
war breaks out between Japan and the United States, making the world a nuclear 
wasteland.  
Aum Shinrikyō was legally registered as a religious movement in Japan, which 
meant that it enjoyed tax breaks and legal protection. As the Aum affair continued to 
unfold, it became clear that the authorities had avoided investigating this organization, 
even though there was ample evidence of its criminal behavior (such as holding cult 
members, forced donations, and kidnapping).
148
 This is due to the negligence of the 
Public Security Intelligence Agency that is responsible for investigations connected with 
the Anti-Subversive Activities Law. With their focus on left-wing movements, they 
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lacked experience surveying religious groups.
149
 The attacks provoked the revising of the 
Religious Corporations Law to increase the Ministry of Education‘s power to collect 
financial data on religious groups. Defenders of religious freedom worried that these new 
laws would erode civil liberties for the sake of public safety. But, the changes in actuality 
only effected Aum, as we can see in the legislations title ―Law to Control Organizations 
That Have Committed Acts of Indiscriminate Violence.‖150 Given that this law was only 
aimed at curtailing Aum‘s activities, which were already verging on total collapse, the 
Japanese government did not fix the problem of dangerous religious cults in Japan.  
This legislation typifies the Japanese government's view of Aum as an anomaly: a 
bizarre religious cult whose rise and attacks were the result of unique circumstances that 
have no bearing on the current system in Japan. This attitude sidesteps the discussion on 
what has caused highly educated Japanese citizens to want to perpetrate violence on their 
own country. Although it was argued that ―March 20, 1995, is a critical date in modern 
Japanese history, and it had the same sort of psychological impact that September 11, 
2001, has had in the United States,‖ the resulting counter-terrorist policies in Japan would 
suggest otherwise.
 151
 Following the reasoning of Friman, Katzenstein, Leheny and 
Okawara, I argue that rather than being used as a justification for strengthening domestic 
surveillance and policing, the Aum Shinrikyō attacks were down-played as a singular 
event because they ran counter to the idea of Japan as a homogeneous, safe state.  The 
downing of the twin towers, unlike the Aum Shinrikyō attacks, were perpetrated by 
foreigners, and therefore were used as a justification for the counter-terrorist policies 
implemented at home and the intelligence and military operations abroad. In contrast, 
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rather than emphasize the dangerous elements within its own citizens in order to prevent 
another tragedy like Aum, the Japanese government chose to use the counter-terrorist 
policies to focus on and exaggerate the threat of foreign crime. 
 Friman, Katzenstein, Leheny and Okawara argue that Japan has ensured domestic 
order by embedding the police in society, who then rely heavily on the concept of Japan‘s 
ethnic homogeneity to maintain social order.
152
 The police have furthered this image with 
the help of Japanese organized crime (yakuza) who provide ―socioeconomic opportunity‖ 
for some foreign residents and marginalized youth in Japanese society.
153
 During the 
1990s, the economic downturn hurt the yakuza and they were unable to maintain the 
same reach they had a decade earlier. This led to a sudden rise in gang related violence, 
and subsequent legislation to reduce organized crime. This new legislation forced the 
yakuza to diversify their industries and lessen their public profile, which destroyed their 
ability to regulate public order and opened the market for foreign organized crime. 
However, the foreign crime syndicates that did enter Japan did not establish new illegal 
industries but merely took over illegal activities that had been carried out by the yakuza. 
 In 2003 crime rates were rising to post-war highs but arrests were at post-war 
lows, focusing public and political attention on the erosion of social order. Organized 
foreign crime emerged as the primary threat in the official government rhetoric, with the 
need for protection of homogeneity and the embedding of police in Japanese society as 
the solution. In August 2003, the National Police Agency (NPA) announced it would be 
adding 10,000 more police officers to ensure public safety by 2006. A month later, 
Ishihara Shintarō pledged to deploy Tokyo police and immigration authorities to seven 
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area prefectures to help decrease crime by foreigners. Foreign crime was a central theme 
in the September 2003 internal LDP elections. This carefully orchestrated campaign drew 
attention away from the relative small role played by foreigners in overall crime statistics 
and the declining numbers of illegal immigrants.  
 The national perception of soaring foreign crimes, ―result[ed] in increasing 
attention to systems that enable the criminalization of noncitizen Korean residents of 
Japan and broader categories of foreigners.‖154 This sentiment can be seen in the passing 
of a wiretapping law in 1999 and the nationally accessible online resident registry called 
JUKI-NET launched in 2002.
155
 Organized crime has been a growing problem in the last 
two decades in Japan; from 1993 to 2003 the number of cases grew by 52% and the 
number of arrests increased by 38%.
156
 However, foreign crime only made up 3.2% of all 
Japanese crime in 2004.
157
 Foreign crime has been overemphasized as the primary risk to 
domestic security, because it strengthens the perception of Japan as a homogeneous, safe 
nation.  
 Similarly, North Korea has been pegged as the main threat to Japan‘s national 
security, especially with their recent development of nuclear and missile technology. 
Japan's focus on North Korea as an external threat has increased exponentially since 
1998, due to the publicity of North Korea‘s abductions, missile launches/nuclear 
weapons, and the discovery of unauthorized North Korean boats (fushinsen) in Japanese 
waters. These threats have been incorrectly construed as terrorist activities by Japanese 
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conservatives, in order to use the events of 9/11 to justify legislation that gives the SDF 
greater ability to contain North Korea. 
On September 17, 2002 at a meeting between North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il 
and Prime Minister Koizumi, Kim admitted to kidnapping around a dozen Japanese 
citizens from the 1970s through the 1980s. Although this apology, as well as the return of 
five abductees, stunned many angry Japanese citizens, it initially served as a promising 
springboard for eventually normalized relations between Japan and North Korea. But the 
Japanese government's anger at the North Korean's inability to give a credible account for 
the remainder of the abducted Japanese citizens, and the overwhelming media coverage 
referring to the incidents as a ―national tragedy‖ has stunted the progress in diplomatic 
relations.
158 
Additionally, North Korea‘s test missile launches in August 1998 and July 
2006, along with a nuclear missile test in October 2006, have all caused alarm and 
anxiety in Japan. Lastly, in 1999 the Japanese Coast Guard fired warning shots at a 
fushinsen in Japanese waters; this suspicious boat was able to get away, but the frequent 
appearance of them caused widespread concern. The kidnapping of Japanese citizens, test 
missile launches over Japan, and the appearance of fushinsen have contributed to the 
perceived constant threat of North Korea in Japan. However, previous threats, in 
particular the Chinese missile tests in the Taiwan Strait in 1996, did not lead to similar 
foreign policy changes as have happened in a post 9/11 Japan.  
Starting in the 1990s, Japan politicians have exploited this external threat of North 
Korea to pass legislation to expand their military and legitimize constitutional revision, 
and similarly they have used the internal challenges of rising crime rates to regulate and 
track foreigners. By insisting that both internal and external threats to Japan are caused 
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by foreigners, the government promotes a policy of intolerance and homogeneity that at 
times verges on xenophobia. This state of fear in Japan has led to new domestic policies 
and a heightened sense of crisis, which combined with the threat of an external attack, 
has weakened the long-held pacifist stance regarding the domestic debate over Japan‘s 
security. Furthermore, the concept of an external enemy has been used in post 9/11 Japan 
to justify the expanding scope of the Self-Defense Forces and hostility toward those who 
protest Japan‘s military involvement.  
Post-9/11 
 
Japan‘s foreign policy in relation to national security changed after the September 
11
th
 attacks on the United States. The counter-terrorism policy prior to the attacks had 
been assessed on a case by case basis. But 9/11 created a strong sense that the threat to 
the international community was comprised of shadowy terrorist groups instead of 
specific states.
159
 The policies that the Japanese government initiated were not direct 
counter-terrorism measures; most of the laws were implemented to support the U.S. and 
their efforts in the Middle East. But PM Koizumi and the LDP used the fear created in the 
wake of 9/11 to push through ―counterterrorism‖ policies that gave the executive branch 
and the SDF more control over national security.
160
  
In response to the September 11
th
 attacks, Japan passed the Anti-Terrorism Special 
Measures Law in October 2001 that permitted the SDF to be dispatched to the Indian 
Ocean and support U.S. combat troops in Afghanistan. Although, this law was only 
effective until 2003 it was extended for an additional two years, and is expected to 
                                                 
159
 Ogoura, 114. 
160
 Friman, et al, 103.  
62 
 
represent Japan‘s future international military policy.161 Furthermore, the Diet revised the 
Coast Guard Law (Kaijō Hoanchō) to allow the use of weapons in Japanese waters on 
suspicious or unknown vessels.
162
 This law was used on December 22, 2001, six weeks 
after the legislation was passed, by four Coast Guard vessels that pursued a North Korean 
fushinsen from Japanese waters into Chinese waters before they were able to sink it. The 
new anti-terrorist laws that were passed in the wake of 9/11 set the stage for Japanese 
troop participation in the Iraq War.  
The United States began their attack on Iraq on March 20, 2003. The Japanese 
government chose to verbally support US unilateral action; however, due to constitutional 
restraints they were unable to send any troops. By May 1, 2003 President Bush declared 
the end of the war in Iraq and called upon other nations to help with the reconstruction 
effort by sending troops, as opposed to financial aid. In July 2003, the Iraq Special 
Measures Law was passed by the Diet. It authorized the SDF to provide humanitarian 
relief to Iraq and logistical support to the U.S. as well as other militaries operating in the 
country for the next four years. This law limits the SDF to special noncombat zones, but 
allows them to transport arms for other militaries. These two laws that have been issued 
in response to the global threat of terrorism have expanded the geographic scope of the 
U.S.-Japan military alliance beyond what was thought possible prior to 9/11.  
 In addition to the laws described above, the Diet also passed legislation on June 6, 
2003 that gave the prime minister and the SDF greater authority to respond to security 
threats. The three bills, The Bill to Respond to Armed Attacks, Bill for Revision on the 
Self-Defense Forces Law, and Bill for Revision on the Law Governing the Security 
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Council of Japan allows the Cabinet to bring immediate military courses of action to the 
Diet for approval, which would then empower the prime minister to exert executive 
power.
 163
 In addition, in 2004 the Japanese Diet approved spending $1 billion to begin 
work on a missile defense shield that will be part of the United States missile defense 
system, linking the continental US and its allies.
164
 These laws enable the SDF to launch 
preemptive strikes if the threat is deemed imminent (with less chance of retaliation), 
which is a complete departure from Article 9 of the Constitution. Since 9/11, the LDP has 
successfully mobilized domestic fear, especially of North Korea, in order to justify an 
expanded role in antiterrorist activities and push through policies to legitimize 
rearmament.  
David Leheny has argued that ―since the September 11th attacks, Japan has moved 
close to the global norms on counterterrorism, through arguably more as an afterthought 
than by initial design.‖165 However, it is clear that the Japanese government has actively 
sought to change the parameters of the SDF to accommodate current global standards on 
counterterrorism in order to expand their military role in the international arena. The U.S. 
demands for Japanese cooperation in American-led attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq after 
9/11, served as a catalyst for expanding Japan's defensive role in the U.S.-Japan security 
alliance. The shift to the right in foreign policy toward a more assertive military role 
overseas has been justified as part of the strategy against global terrorism, most 
commonly associated with North Korea. But, North Korea's actions after the 1980s 
kidnappings, through obviously meant to intimidate Japan, cannot be construed as acts of 
terrorism, like the attacks on the Twin Towers. Yet, the LDP has effectively connected the 
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broader notion of terrorism with the domestic fear of the threat of North Korea and 
foreign criminals to justify Japan‘s changing security policies.  
Resistance to Militarization  
 The protest against the Gulf War occurred both politically in the Diet and 
academically through statements and critiques, but was not evident in the public sphere. 
At a symposium in Tokyo held on February 9
th
, 1991, a collective statement against the 
war, written by a group of highly successful and influential, young writers and critics, 
including Karatani Kōjin, Kawamura Minato, Nakagami Kenji, Shimada Masakiho and 
Tanaka Yasuo, was ―issued, signed and publicized in the New York Times.‖166 This 
statement was divided in two parts; the first part read ―I oppose the participation of the 
Japanese state in the Gulf War.‖167 The second part gave an explanation for opposition to 
participation in the war. It argued that the Japanese people had chosen to renounce war 
based on the regret they feel for their actions in WWII. It continued to assert that Article 
9 makes the Japanese constitution the most universal and radical constitution, and it 
embodies the hope of those in the West who experienced two world wars. This statement, 
though prepared by intellectuals, also characterizes the ideology of the Japanese Socialist 
Party and other leftist political parties‘ who were active in blocking legislation that would 
increase Japan's involvement in the Persian Gulf War.
168
 Opposition to the Gulf War in 
the political and intellectual spheres was so organized and effective that there was 
arguably no need for comparable public resistance.  
 In contrast, the 2003 Iraq War did not mobilize the intellectual and political figures 
of society as did the Gulf War; instead, the opposition came from traditional protesters: 
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trade unionists, socialists, communists, anarchists, ecologists, antiwar activists, but also 
newly invigorated freeters, students, and families.
169
 Despite the overwhelming public 
opposition to the Iraq War, especially compared to the Gulf War, PM Koizumi decided to 
dispatch 550 soldiers to Iraq. The public outcry against Koizumi's actions had roots in 
anti-U.S. imperialism, antiwar sentiment, and concern over Japan's ability to finance 
participation in the war. The lack of effective public response from the intellectuals and 
leftist political parties to the Iraq War was obviously detrimental to the goal of the 
protesters. But, it did open up a void in political action that was quickly filled by the 
marginalized and non-conforming members of society, the freeters.  
 On March 21, 2003, just after the US/UK coalition forces began their attack on 
Iraq, 500,000 people gathered in Hibiya Park for an anti-war rally, this represented a 
significant shift in anti-war protests towards a rebirth of the left-wing street activism. The 
rally was not a traditional political demonstration, but rather took the form of a street art 
performance. Three hundred young people at the front were dressed in colorful costumes, 
carrying contemporary art and boom boxes, and playing music, while others were 
dancing.
170
 These young people are members of the Korosuna group that carries signs at 
demonstrations saying ―Korosuna, Do Not Kill.‖ This is just one of the many new 
political groups that formed out of the anti-Iraq movement and exists clearly in both the 
political and cultural realm.  
 The second major street rave occurred in Shibuya on July 7, 2003 and was 
organized by a group called Anti-Street Control; it included about two to four thousand 
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people and attracted an extraordinary level of media attention.
171
 This street rally 
denounced the military agendas of the United States and Japan, and featured the theme of 
anti-Bush/ anti-Koizumi/ anti-Ishihara. Initially the focus was more on Bush and 
Koizumi, but as the rally progressed it shifted to Ishihara, who had been the largest critic 
of freeters participating in anti-war demonstrations. It is estimated that the percentage of 
freeters at the rally was 85-90 percent. The street protests continue to be symbolic 
because they were the first time that the freeters chose to involve themselves in politics, 
and could represent a new politicized group.  
 The new wave of activism among freeters continued throughout 2004 when freeter 
activists chose to go to Iraq to help the Iraqis and promote peace. These activities were 
highly publicized because five Japanese freeters were taken hostage in early spring 2004. 
The three most famous incidents involved thirty-four year old Takato Naoko, who started 
a NPO to aid homeless Iraqi children; twenty-six year old freelance photographer 
Koriyama Soichiro; and eighteen year old Imai Noriaki, who was investigating damage 
caused by depleted uranium munitions.
172
 The ensuing hostage crisis resulted in a public 
turn against these youths and a new perception of the freeter as troublemakers and 
dissidents.  
 These three young Japanese were abducted from Baghdad in the first week of 
April 2004. The insurgence demanded that Japan withdraw their troops and financial 
support from the US invasion of Iraq, or they would slit the throats of the hostages. The 
Japanese government adamantly refused to negotiate or consider the terrorist demands. 
The families of the hostages therefore became publicly critical of the government and 
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pleaded that they consider opening a dialogue with the insurgents; this evoked a negative 
response from the public that was quickly capitalized on by the government.
173
 
Astonishingly, the hostages were blamed for their irresponsibility and, according to 
government spokesman and future Prime Minister, Fukuda Yasuo, ―causing Japan so 
much trouble.‖174 The initial attack by the Koizumi administration against the hostages 
―mobilized a mix of neoliberal (―personal responsibility‖) and nationalist (―shameful to 
the nation‖) codes‖ that were picked up and used by the mass media.175 The media, like 
the conservatives, chose to blame the situation on the young freeters, and diverted any 
blame from Koizumi's government for supporting an unconstitutional and unpopular 
invasion. The blame for the hostages themselves became so widespread that upon their 
return they received hate mail for having shamed Japan and were maliciously billed by 
the Japanese government for their medical examination and return airfare.
176
 These 
events were manipulated by the Koizumi administration to depoliticize the situation and 
deflect criticism of the Iraq War onto the Japanese youth.  
 While the emergence of the freeter as a new political force is reminiscent of the 
student element of the 1960s protests, the organization and effectiveness of their protests 
leads one to question their message and intent. The Korosuna group is much more 
culture-oriented and anonymous than their Vietnam era counterpart, Beheiren.
177
 
Similarly their protests and other anti-war rallies are more fragmented and atomized, 
where participants show up last minute on a whim and don't know one another. This has 
elicited criticism from the political activists of the 1960s and 1970s, about the new 
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protest movement‘s lack of recognition of real conflict, anger, and message in their 
protest.
178
 Furthermore, this political mobilization of the freeters was very short-lived. By 
2004, the troop dispatch was an established fact and regardless of what decisions came to 
the Diet afterwards, they were not radical enough to remobilize the population.
179
 People 
had become accustomed to the troops being stationed in Iraq and many lost interest in the 
protest. Additionally, the disgrace of the freeter hostages turned many people away from 
the anti-war opposition. Therefore, the peace activists were forced not only to keep the 
interest of their supporters, but also re-convince them to share their opinions. The failure 
of the new protest movements to retain their audience, given the initial widespread 
support suggests that the protesters lack of message or passion and their refusal to 
organize have made them inadequate vehicles for political change.  
 In the early 1990s an anti-war movement arose from established literary critics 
and novelists, yet there was no equivalent mass mobilization. But in 2003 most of the 
intellectuals remained silent during the deliberations on involvement in Iraq, and 
resistance was taken up by the younger generation.
180
 Mōri argues that the lack of protest 
from intellectuals during the start of the Iraq War is a result of a changing relationship 
between the intellectuals and the masses, high culture and popular culture.
181
 While this 
might be true, it is evident that the lack of intellectual support in the protest against the 
Iraq War in 2003 has had a negative effect on the protest‘s outcome. It is clear that the 
masses, freeters, students, families, etc, need the support of the intellectual and political 
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elites in order to maintain legitimacy and effect change. The fact that by 2004 there were 
no more anti-war demonstrations indicates that the mass protests against the Iraq War 
were trendy and ephemeral movements rather than an intrinsic belief for the new 
generation of protesters.
182
   
The question remains as to why the intellectuals chose to remain silent in 2003, 
when there was large support and many opportunities to condemn Japan‘s involvement in 
the Iraq War. This phenomenon can be attributed to the gradual shift to the political right 
in all segments of Japanese society. The government‘s ability, as illustrated above, to 
manipulate foreign and domestic events to justify and necessitate its expanded military 
powers and troop deployment abroad has made society‘s conventional majority wary of 
protesting. Furthermore, the LDP‘s ability to criticize the demonstrators, mostly freeter, 
has turned public and media opinion against protest. This has left the LDP with free reign 
to implement policies that enhanced Japan‘s military and national security abilities, 
without an open forum for discussion of their lasting repercussions.  
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Conclusion 
After the collapse of the bubble economy in the early 1990s, Japan experienced a 
series of overwhelming internal political, economic, and social problems that have 
continued to afflict society today. The utter destruction of the post-war boom in Japan 
ignited a sense of national panic and crisis, which was only further justified by the 
devastation of the Great Hanshin earthquake and the Aum Shinrikyō attack. In wake of 
these disasters the people and government of Japan searched for a way to halt the 
economic collapse and the decline of the traditional family. In the midst of this crisis, 
nationalism rose to the fore as a solution to the widespread social malaise. The 
conservatives took control of the nationalist discourse and blamed the nation‘s problems 
on Japanese lack of patriotism and masochistic view of their own history. They singled 
out the youth, which seems to characterize the most non-traditional members of society, 
who simultaneously became the consequence and cause of the social problems. The 
implementation of policies that support historical revisionism, patriotic education, and 
constitutional revisionism, particularly over Article 9, have been crafted and marketed by 
the Japanese government as necessary remedies for the supposed internal social collapse 
and emerging regional threat. However, since the early 90‘s the political, economic, and 
social situation in Japan has arguably only deteriorated further, which suggests that the 
LDP‘s conservative reforms that were intended to reaffirm a national identity and inspire 
patriotism cannot, in fact, fix Japan‘s current crisis.  
 Since the conception of this paper, Japan's central political forces and actors have 
entirely changed. The Liberal Democratic Party was thrown out of power in the fall of 
2009 for only the second time since 1955. The new ruling party, the Democratic Party of 
71 
 
Japan, and the current prime minister, Hatoyama Yukio, are charged with the task of 
fixing the failing political, economic, and social systems of Japan. The expulsion of the 
LDP has sparked debate over Japan‘s new direction, and whether it will deviate from the 
LDP model of bureaucratic politics and nationalist rhetoric. We are starting to hear voices 
proclaiming an end to the cultural nationalism of the post-bubble era. Mark Driscoll 
argues that the resignation of PM Abe Shinzō after only one year in power ―allegorizes a 
fall of sorts for the ultranationalist positions espoused by Abe, Kobayashi, and the Japan 
Conference.‖183 But, even with the fall of PM Abe Shinzō and the rise of the DPJ, it is 
premature to proclaim the death of conservatism and nationalist policies. The LDP fell 
from power primarily because the economic collapse of 2008 further highlighted the 
political and social problems in Japan. The DPJ, though it at times has formed coalitions 
with small liberal groups, is essentially conservative. A large part of the party is made up 
of ex-LDP politicians who continue to support the LDP implemented status quo of 
historical revisionism, patriotic education, and constitutional revision. 
 The LDP‘s dramatic ousting was due to a string of poor, unreliable politicians; the 
failing economic system (that can be largely attributed to the collapse of sub-prime 
mortgages in the United States); and the myriad social ills that have been exacerbated by 
the financial crisis.  The global financial crisis that began in 2008 caused Japan‘s 2008 
fourth-quarter GDP to shrink 3.5%, a trend that continued into 2009. In addition, 
unemployment rose to a historic high of 5.7% in July 2009, the month before the election 
in the lower house was called.
184
 In 2007, LDP party leaders chose Abe Shinzō to replace 
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the popular PM Koizumi after he retired. However, Abe only lasted a year before having 
to step down due to lack of public and intra-party support. Abe was replaced by the 
equally lackluster Fukuda Yasuo who also only lasted a year, before being replaced by 
Asō Tarō. PM Asō continued with traditional LDP policies; to placate the population‘s 
growing social concerns, he passed a stimulus bill in March 2009 to hand out 12,000 yen 
($130) in cash to every adult and 8,000 yen ($88) to children and elderly.
185
 This stimulus 
bill illustrated the LDP‘s lack of understanding of the structural reforms needed in Japan, 
and the fact that handing out money would not begin to solve the myriad social problems 
of the past two decades. The public had no role in the elevation of these three LDP 
politicians to the post of prime minister, who were all voted in by the lower house of the 
Diet that had a LDP majority.  
 The Economist described the election of the Democratic Party of Japan, one that 
broke the half-century lock of the Liberal Democratic Party, as an ―earth-shattering 
event.‖ The LDP was only able to retain 119 of 400 seats (down from 300), whereas the 
DPJ garnered 308 seats, up from 115 seats.
186
 During the election, the DPJ campaigned 
on a series of radical reforms to change the problems that plagued the LDP's reign. At the 
onset of PM Hatoyama‘s term in October, his approval rating stood above 70%.187 This 
vote has been seen as monumental due to the scale of the DPJ victory, the implication of 
big changes in Japan's political culture, and the dismantling of the entire ―iron triangle‖ 
system.
188
 Although I agree that ―the voters reject[ed] the old system in favor of 
something unfamiliar in Japan,‖ this does not imply that the nationalist policies and 
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rhetoric in Japan have been moderated.
189
  
 PM Hatoyama promised to reduce government spending and bureaucracy, 
improve the social safety net, and redefine the power dynamic with the United States. 
However, only a few months into office, Japan‘s political and economic realities have 
already hindered his efforts to keep campaign promises. Japan has the highest public-
debt-to-GPD ratio among the world‘s developed economies.190 PM Hatoyama has cut 
back on infrastructure spending, but these cutbacks are being replaced with increases in 
social spending. He has pledged to reduce the economy's reliance on export industries, 
yet does not have a clear plan outlined. He is trying to break the hold of the bureaucracy, 
but these reforms will probably take a matter of years. Six months into his appointment, 
PM Hatoyama‘s initially strong public support has already fallen; as of March 9, 2010 his 
cabinet's approval rate was 37.7%.
191
 While still far above the previous LDP prime 
minister's ratings, it is still almost a 50% drop from his approval rating last fall. Although, 
PM Hatoyama is trying to avoid the mistake of the previous non-LDP prime minister, 
Hosokawa, of ―advocating political reform but then, once in office, following traditional 
policies for fear that voters were not ready for real change,‖ it is questionable whether he 
can implement reforms quick enough to satisfy the public. 
192
  
In addition, the corruption scandals that plagued the LDP have already begun to 
besiege the DPJ. The former president of the DPJ, Ozawa Ichirō, resigned because of a 
scandal involving his close aide, Okubo Takanori, who was indicted on March 24, 2009 
                                                 
189
 The Economist, ―The vote that changed Japan.‖ 
190
 Clouse, ―Japan: New Premier Charts A Difficult Course,‖   
191 
M Data TV Watch – Tokyo, ―Hatoyama Cabinet, Approval rating continuing to fall.‖  
192
 Funabashi, 117. 
74 
 
for taking illegal political contributions from a construction company.
193
 Furthermore, 
PM Hatoyama has recently been caught up in a political donation scandal, where he 
allegedly falsified the political donation reports covering up a huge sum of money that he 
was receiving from his mother.
194
  
The lack of change and emergence of scandals during the DPJ‘s short time in 
power have left Japanese doubting their ability to implement much needed reforms in 
Japan. I argue that the DPJ is not left or progressive; essentially the shift of power was 
from one conservative party to another, the only difference is that the DPJ was not an 
entrenched institutional ruling machine. According to the Defence Journal, over half of 
the people who voted for the DPJ did not even support their main platform or policies.
195
 
Although, this clearly articulates the utter rejection of the LDP, it also shows the tenuous 
hold that the DPJ has over Japan. Unlike Barack Obama in the United States, there was 
no following or personal adoration for Hatoyama Yukio. If at any time the voters believe 
that the LDP would be better for them then the DPJ, it is hard to imagine they will have 
any trouble switching allegiance.  
 Of PM Hatoyama‘s accomplishments, his decisive role in curtailing Japan‘s 
military and security relationship with the United States is most relevant to my study. 
Japan's defense minister ordered the nation's naval ships to return from the Indian Ocean 
in January, fulfilling a pledge by PM Hatoyama to end an eight-year refueling mission in 
Afghanistan and Japan‘s military involvement abroad.196 This is symbolic of the DPJ‘s 
efforts to reduce Japan‘s dependence on the United States, and create an East Asian 
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Community that limits the United States‘ involvement.197 At first glance, one might 
expect that these reforms are repealing previous conservative policies on the Self Defense 
Forces. However, by limiting the security relationship between Japan and the United 
States, the DPJ is actually forcing the SDF to expand since Japan will no longer be under 
the American security umbrella. Moreover, PM Hatoyama has explicitly expressed that 
he firmly believes that the Article 9 should be revised, which would then allow for an 
official standing military that would not be dependent on the U.S.
198
 
 Since the DPJ rose to power there has been little actual change in the Japanese 
political, economic, and social structures. But, it has allowed many people to hope for the 
rise of a new, more moderate Japan in the near future. In the midst of the post-1990s 
crisis, the LDP has marketed itself as a party of experience and has promised 
constitutional reform, patriotic education, and fiscal austerity.
199
 In contrast, the DPJ‘s 
platform has promised to rein in irresponsible bureaucrats, end corporate giving to 
political parties (pork-barrel politics), and squarely address the dire social issues. 
Moreover, in the realm of foreign policy, the DPJ pledged to seek a more equal 
relationship with the U.S. and closer relations with their Asian neighbors. Although the 
DPJ‘s campaign goals have not yet been realized, their fresh take on how to solve Japan‘s 
problems suggests that they might be able to address some of Japan‘s post-bubble ills, 
while shifting away from the current nationalist, conservative political paradigm. 
 The DPJ has already claimed that they will take decisive steps away from the 
trend of historical revisionism that emerged in the 1990s. PM Hatoyama has called for a 
non-controversial secular World War II memorial to be built to replace the Yasukuni 
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shrine as the place to honor the war dead.
200
 Furthermore, Foreign Minister Okada 
Katsuya has called for the publication of history textbooks jointly written with South 
Korea and the Chinese.
201
  These gestures to other Asian nations are setting the stage to 
realize PM Hatoyama‘s desire for an East Asian community that could eventually turn 
into an East Asian free trade zone. A free trade zone would link the great East Asian 
nations tightly together economically and their perpetual cooperation and goodwill would 
be vital to each nation‘s success. These reforms suggest that the DPJ is moving away 
from the policies of historical revisionism that the LDP used as a tool to rally the 
Japanese. As a non-Japanese, it is difficult to position myself within this debate over 
nationalism. However, the nationalist rhetoric that has pervaded Japan in the past two 
decades seems to have only antagonized potential allies and has not yet succeeded in 
providing the Japanese with a constructive war narrative. The creation of an East Asian 
community could effectively allow Japan to recast wartime relations with its Asian 
neighbors and move forward in the future.  
 To deal with the emerging social problems in post-bubble Japan, the DPJ has 
emphasized the need to foster a domestic-demand driven economy based on higher wages 
and social benefits. In the ―DPJ Financial Crisis Access Plan‖ they advocate for equal 
treatment for part-time and limited term contact employees.
202
 This would ban 
employment agencies from dispatching employees for periods of less than two months 
and require companies to provide equal treatment for all employees regardless of 
employment status. Additionally they pledge to provide support for young people who 
are not in stable employment, by providing job-training, housing allowances, and 
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monthly stipends.
203
  The DPJ is also trying to prevent bankruptcies in order to sustain 
employment and consumer spending until the recovery kicks in. Unlike the LDP who 
blamed society‘s ills on the youth and freeter, the DPJ recognizes the need to help 
reintegrate this generation back into society and address their very real social and 
economic problems. Similarly to historical revisionism, the advent of patriotic education 
as a way to correct Japan‘s social problems has not seemed to work. The DPJ has chosen 
to advocate reforms that could directly impact Japanese society, instead of following the 
status quo that blamed the decline of traditional family values and by extension the 
nation‘s social problems on the lack of patriotism in students, singles, and slackers 
(freeters). Hopefully, the DPJ will be able to reform or at least liberalize many of the 
conservative policies that have been forced on Japanese education since the 1990s.  
 As explained above, PM Hatoyama is attempting to change Japan‘s security 
relationship with the United States. In addition to PM Hatoyama‘s refusal to renew the 
SDF‘s refueling mission to Afghanistan, the DPJ is attempting to remove the Futenma 
base facilities from Okinawa. Although the DPJ still favors joint missile defense and anti-
terrorism cooperation with the U.S., it is firmly opposed to nuclear weapons and a 
stronger overseas military role for the SDF.
204
 Given that the DPJ is not trying to rearm 
Japan, they might be able to delink the discussion of the revision of Article 9 from 
extreme nationalist rhetoric. Since the discussion of Article 9 has been so wrapped up in a 
nationalist rhetoric, any debate over its revision has set off warning bells of militarism. 
But, perhaps since the DPJ does not have members that vocally espouse the nationalist 
ideology of the LDP, they will be able to shape a nuanced discussion of constitutional 
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revision and its long-term effects on issues such as Japan‘s ability to contribute troops to 
international crises.  
It is imperative that Japan move past the ideology of post-war Japan that 
flourished under the cold-war paradigm, and instead become a normal nation that is able 
to have a military and express national pride in a way that is not threatening.
205
 LDP 
conservatives tried to move Japan forward using a nationalist discourse that has only 
complicated their progress by making it more controversial. The DPJ is offering a new 
path for Japan to move beyond defining their relations with other Asian nations by World 
War II, correct the post-bubble social malaise, and revise the pacifist constitution in a 
way that disassociates the debate from nationalism. The DPJ is making it a priority to 
build good relationships with Japan‘s Asian neighbors, looking for solutions beyond 
patriotic education to fix society‘s ills, and striving to change the constitution without 
appearing threatening or militaristic. If the DPJ is able to stay in power, they could in fact 
moderate the political, judicial, and social norms that were forced to the right through 
implementation of conservative policies and bring Japan out of their decades of political, 
social, and economic malaise.  
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